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ABSTRACT. In their seminal paper, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) find that infor-
mative advertising is socially excessive in an oligopoly pure-strategy symmetric
equilibrium (PSSE). However, their analysis assumed that every consumer receives
at least one advertisement. Christou and Vettas (2008) present counter-examples,
showing that if this assumption does not hold, the PSSE advertising may, instead,
be insufficient. Christou and Vettas (2008) also show by example that quasi-
concavity may not hold in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and that there may be
non-existence due to discontinuities from undercutting, although deriving exis-
tence conditions (not derived in Grossman and Shapiro (1984)) is infeasible. We
revisit the question by modeling firms (like consumers) as a continuum, which
mitigates the discontinuity, enables the derivation of intuitive existence conditions
for a PSSE, and allows a general analysis including when some consumers receive
no advertisements. More importantly, we find that advertising is always socially
insufficient and entry is also insufficient.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Advertising is ubiquitous in print, airwaves and digital media with over a half-
trillion dollars being spent on advertising each year (wwHw.statista.com). With
advertising, a firm can persuade consumers to buy its product by communicating
to them its characteristics and prices. This also allows the firm to distinguish its
product from its competitors’ and to enter into new markets, including those in which
consumers are already aware of its rivals’ products.
Given the large expenditures on advertising, its potential informational role and its
effect on consumption decisions, determining the welfare effect these expenditures
create for society has been a focus of economists, policy makers, and the public.
Seminal, classic work by Butters (1977) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984) intro-
duced the modeling to investigate how informative (truthful) advertising benefits
society through demand creation in the former (consumers learn of the existence of
the market) and better matching in the latter (consumers learn a product’s character-
istics relative to rival products).1 Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model the matching
effect by using the Salop (1979) circular-city model: Hotelling-type transportation
costs represent society’s loss from poor product matches.
While society and firms incur the same cost from advertising, the benefits to
society can differ from the individual firm’s benefit even with truthful advertising.
That is, the market could have excessive or insufficient advertising from the social
perspective. First, society’s benefit from the demand creation effect tends to be
greater than the firm’s as a firm usually does not capture the consumer’s entire benefit
from learning about the product (i.e., consumer surplus).2 However, the relationship
between society’s benefit from the matching effect (consumers get products closer
to their most preferred) versus the firm’s benefit (it steals a sale from a rival whose
profit is not factored into the firm’s maximization problem –the business stealing
effect) is ambiguous (Bagwell, 2007).
A key result in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) is that for a given number of firms
advertising is socially excessive in a pure strategy symmetric equilibrium (PSSE).
However, they note the demand creation effect is not present in their model because
to solve the model they use an approximation (which they state is “most accurate”
when there is a large number of firms) that implies all consumers receive at least one
ad. Thus, their analytical results turn only on whether the business stealing effect is
greater than the matching effect. Christou and Vettas (2008, Fn. 29), though, find
that numerical examples show that the Grossman and Shapiro (1984) result “is not
generally correct” if there are only a few firms. They also show through examples
that there can be insufficient advertising in a random utility model and note that
Tirole (1988) had mooted this possibility and demonstrated it in a Hotelling model.
The main point of Christou and Vettas (2008), though, is that the equilibrium in
these models may not exist (Grossman and Shapiro (1984) do not derive existence
conditions): “Quasi-concavity of profits may fail, as each firm may prefer to deviate
to a high price, targeting consumers who only become informed about its own
product.”3 Unfortunately, deriving conditions for the existence of the PSSE in the
1However, as these models assume unit demand and covered market, a third beneficial “quantity-
demand effect” resulting from the lower prices induced by advertising does not exist.
2Shapiro (1980) shows that a monopolist under-advertises for this reason.
3Grossman and Shapiro (1984, Fn. 8) by assumption restrict the firm to prices below this price
arguing the restriction “amounts to putting an upper bound on 푣 [the consumer’s value of her most
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random utility model of Christou and Vettas (2008) is not feasible either. The main
issue is that profits are discontinuous in price: a firm may choose to deviate from
the equilibrium to a lower price that causes a discrete increase in demand.
We return to the question of informative advertising in an oligopoly, but with a
different approach to resolve the problems with discontinuity, allow for the demand
creation effect, and obtain existence conditions so that the PSSE can be characterized
without the use of an approximation. We do this by using the Salop (1979) model but
take Grossman and Shapiro (1984) implicit assumption that the number of firms is
large to the limit: we consider a continuum of firms just as Butters (1977) implicitly
assumes,4 which mirrors the assumption on consumers.5 A priori the assumption
would not appear to change the underlying market mechanisms, and indeed our
PSSE price and profits expressions are consistent with Grossman and Shapiro (1984)
and have the same comparative statics.6 With this assumption a price decrease never
induces a discrete increase in demand and as a result, we can achieve our goals.
Finally, this assumption allows us to focus on the effect entry has on advertising
without conflating entry’s effect on reducing transportation costs (as Stahl (1994,
Fn. 1) noted) because with a continuum entry solely increases the mass of firms.7
The first gain from our approach is that we derive two explicit conditions for the
existence of a (unique) PSSE. The first, expressed by Equation (16) in Section 4, is
that the consumer must receive an advertisement from another firm with probability
no smaller than 1∕2 - else, each firm would prefer to charge the monopoly price.
This condition effectively requires that marginal advertising cost is low relative to
transportation cost. The second condition, expressed by Equation (17), is that the
monopoly price cannot be too much greater than the competitive price interacting
with the probability that a firm is in a monopoly position. For example, if the
competitive price is too close to marginal cost, then the monopoly price can be
attractive even if the firm is very unlikely to be in a monopoly position. This
interaction can have counter-intuitive implications as greater advertising costs may
be needed for the PSSE to exist: with too low advertising costs, aggregate advertising
is too large, driving the candidate PSSE price too low so that firms would deviate.8
Another gain from our approach is that we can have amonopolistically competitive
PSSE in which a large fraction of consumers receives no advertisements, while
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) results are derived under the assumption that all
consumers receive at least one ad.9 As discussed above, several have noted that
if some consumers receive no advertisements, advertising might then be socially
preferred brand],” but they do not explicitly derive the value of 푣 needed for this (which may conflict
with their covered-market assumption).
4Butters (1977) assumes the number of firms approaches infinity so that the Poisson distribution
can be used to approximate the probability that any given consumer receives an ad.
5Though we do not study this, in the limit, as transportation costs approach zero, the model
approaches the Butters (1977) model.
6Not all of the comparative statics in the model of Christou and Vettas (2008) are the same.
7In Grossman and Shapiro (1984), entry reduces aggregate transportation costs directly.
8The second condition (푣 cannot be too large) also points to a potential issue with the covered
market assumption (that 푣 cannot be too small, so that all consumers that receive an advertisement,
will choose to buy) made in all of the models. That is, the 푣 that satisfies both could be the empty set,
though it is not in our model.
9While Grossman and Shapiro (1984) do provide examples that have a small number of firms (푛),
the probability that every consumer receives at least one ad is roughly 1 in these examples. E.g., for the
benchmark case, the probability is 0.9999. The lowest probability in any of the examples is 0.9945.
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insufficient. We prove this in our setting. However, we find an even stronger result:
that advertising is socially insufficient even if nearly all consumers receive an ad,
that is, advertising is always socially insufficient (Proposition 5).
The intuition for our result is as follows. When aggregate advertising is low, and
each customer is unlikely to receive multiple advertisements, there is a substantial
demand creation effect from more advertising. In this case, as the firm does not
capture all the surplus, its private return is less than the social return, a well-known
effect. As aggregate advertising increases, it becomes more likely that a consumer
that the firm reaches also receives other advertisements. The return to society
becomes smaller as it is more about a better match (saving in transportation costs),
than demand creation, but at the same time the PSSE price decreases so the firm’s
return is also smaller. In addition, with incomplete information, there are two effects
that reduce the firm’s return. First, “competition is no longer localized” (Grossman
and Shapiro, 1984, p. 76); the firm potentially competes for the consumers the
furthest away from it. In contrast, with complete information the firm only competes
for consumers that are immediate neighbors: with incomplete information the price
induces the furthest consumer to buy while with complete information the firm is not
concerned with the furthest consumer. Second, as aggregate advertising increases,
there is a greater chance the firm is competing with a rival who is an arbitrarily
close substitute to consumers. These forces push down the price, reducing the firm’s
return. As a result of these effects, the social return remains greater than the firm’s
and so there still is socially too little advertising. In the following Subsection 1.1 we
go into more detail as to how our results relate to previous results in the literature.
We also consider how social and private returns differ as the product becomes
more differentiated. Christou and Vettas (2008) provide examples with a fixed
number of firms in which advertising can be either insufficient or excessive from a
social point of view, depending on whether product differentiation is weak or strong.
In our model, we show that as product differentiation increases, the private value
increases relative to the social value because the PSSE price increases.
We then endogenize entry and again find that our comparative statics are in line
with Grossman and Shapiro (1984).10 In particular, we find, as they do, that an
increase in the cost of advertising could increase profits when the number of firms is
fixed, and so induce entry. We show that in particular, this can occur when there is
a proportional increase in the marginal cost of advertising. We present an example
demonstrating that with quadratic cost of advertising, an increase in the coefficient
of marginal cost increases profits for a fixed number of firms. The intuition is that
advertising is a prisoner’s dilemma (the cooperative solution has less advertising),
so increasing sharply the cost of the last units of advertising can increase profits by
inducing the cooperative goal of less advertising.
Finally, we show that socially there is too little entry: the planner would have more
firms enter the market, while in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) the planner would
reduce entry. This result occurs despite our model not having the social benefit of
entry reducing transportation costs as it does in Grossman and Shapiro (1984). The
reason for the difference partly turns on the earlier discussion regarding localized
competition, but also on that inherently there is excessive entry in the Salop model.
In contrast with a continuum, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) find there can be too much
or too little entry. Intuitively, since our model does not have the excess entry effect
10Because of intractability, the entry PSSE cannot be characterized in Christou and Vettas (2008).
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nor a direct effect on transportation costs, entry is solely a question of its effect on
advertising (which has an indirect effect on transportation costs). As we had already
seen that for a fixed number of firms there is too little advertising, then that there is
too little entry is no longer surprising. In some sense, the planner’s problem is to
choose the level of aggregate advertising while minimizing cost through the choice
of entry and advertising levels.
1.1. Related Literature onAdvertising andWelfare. As noted above, our finding
that advertising is always is socially insufficient in ourmodel contrasts with Grossman
and Shapiro (1984) finding that advertising is always socially excessive in their model.
However, the differences are not quite so stark as Christou and Vettas (2008, Fn.
29) found examples in which there is insufficient advertising in the Grossman and
Shapiro (1984) model. Second, the assumption that all consumers receive at least
one ad in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) eliminates the demand creation effect (an
effect that leads to socially insufficient advertising). Third, this assumption also
weakens the welfare gain from the matching effect, as the assumption means that
consumers are very likely to receive advertisements from at least two firms, etc.11
Since the consumer is likely to receive multiple advertisements, the welfare gain
from another advertisement is reduced. Finally, with the continuum of sellers here
there is always the potential for a competing seller to be arbitrarily close, while in
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) there is always a gap between sellers (as their model
does not hold as the number of firms goes to infinity) giving the firm there more
market power and so higher prices.
In contrast, socially insufficient advertising is consistent with models of advertis-
ing in markets with a homogeneous product, where equilibrium generally features
price dispersion (Butters (1977), Stahl (1994), Stegeman (1991)). Our model can be
viewed as extending this general finding to when products are differentiated. How-
ever, to account for the dominance of the incomplete surplus appropriation effect
typically observed in those models, Renault (2015) notes that if the price distribution
features no mass points, then the offers of the sellers charging the largest price in the
support of the distribution are only accepted by the consumers who receive no other
offers; hence, the business stealing effect is completely absent, and only the surplus
appropriation affects the advertising decisions of these sellers. Moreover, the social
value of any advertisement delivered (weakly) increases as the asking price drops,
whereas the private return for the sellers is identical for all prices in the support of
the distribution. Hence, equality between marginal revenue and marginal advertising
cost entails under-provision of advertising, in equilibrium - except in the case of
inelastic demand, considered for example in Butters (1977). In our setting with a
continuous product space and a uniform distribution of sellers charging identical
prices, the critical case above of offers only accepted by consumers who receive no
other offers does not occur. Further, consumers always choose the products whose
consumption generates the greatest surplus among those for which they receive
advertisements. Thus, for any given level of the advertising chosen by the sellers,
the number and the quality of the matches created in equilibrium are socially optimal,
and incomplete surplus appropriation leads to the under-provision of advertising,
given the elastic demand functions faced by the sellers.12
11Even in their simulations, the probability of receiving advertisements from at least four firms is
high. For example, in the benchmark case, it is 0.96 with 푛 = 14.
12We are thankful to Régis Renault for pointing out the similarity between the two scenarios to us.
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1.2. Plan of the Paper. The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the model, and Section 3 characterizes the conditions guaran-
teeing surplus maximization. Sections 4, 5 and 6 characterize the sellers’ pricing,
advertising, and entry PSSE decisions. Section 7 presents an example that highlights
some important points, with particular reference to the case of free entry, and Section
8 contains some concluding remarks. The proofs of the main results are in Appendix
A; the results related to the model’s comparative statics are in Appendix B, along
with the respective proofs.
2. THE MODEL
We model preferences and production as in the standard Grossman and Shapiro
(1984); Salop (1979) setting, with a unit continuum of buyers, endowed with a prefer-
ence parameter that is uniformly distributed around a circle with unit circumference.
Each buyer demands at most one unit of one of the products. The distance between
any two arbitrary addresses 푥 and 푠 in [0, 1) is defined as
푑(푠, 푥) = min{|푠 − 푥|, 1 − |푠 − 푥|}, (1)
where |.| is the absolute value operator. A buyer with preference parameter (or
“address”) 푥 who purchases and consumes the product of seller 푠 at the price 푝푠receives utility
푢(푥, 푠) = 푣 − 푡 푑(푠, 푥) − 푝푠,
where 푣 ∈ ℝ++ and 푡 ∈ ℝ++ respectively express the payoff from consumption ofthe “ideal” product and the pace at which the payoff decreases as 푑(푠, 푥) increases.
To dispense with tedious qualifications related to possible corner solutions, we
follow Grossman and Shapiro (1984)13 and make the standard “covered market”
assumption, expressed, in this case, by 푡 < 푣. Under this assumption, each buyer
would be willing to pay the monopoly price 푣− 푡2 even for her least preferred product.There is also a set Σ of potential, ex-ante identical sellers. By default, all sellers
are inactive. Each seller who decides to be active chooses an arbitrary address in
the circle and produce as many units of the product as she wishes, upon demand,
at the constant unit cost of 0. The buyers who do not purchase a product and the
sellers who remain inactive realize a payoff equal to 0. The size of the set of the
sellers who choose to be active is denoted by 푚.
The buyers may in principle know about the existence of the sellers and the
products, but they are only able to purchase the products - if any - for which they
receive advertisements from the respective sellers, The advertisements truthfully
inform the buyers about the characteristics and price of the products, and the number
of advertisements delivered by each seller is drawn from a Poisson distribution
with parameter 훼 ∈ ℝ+, whose value is chosen by the seller and coincides with theexpected number of advertisements delivered.
In connection with the delivery process, we can envisage our circle as a projection
of a vertical cylinder with unit height, with the buyers uniformly distributed on its
side surface and each vertical line identifying buyers with identical preferences. The
identities of the buyers who receive the advertisements are then randomly drawn
from the uniform distribution on the cylinder’s side-surface. The draws are thus
independent, both for each seller and across sellers; the addresses of the potential
trading partners faced by each seller are uniformly distributed around the circle, and
13See Grossman and Shapiro (1984, Fn. 9).
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the probability of multiple advertisements delivered by a seller to any given buyer is
equal to 0.
The advertising costs faced by each seller is linked to the level variable 훼 by the
function 푐 ∶ ℝ+ → ℝ+, which is at least twice differentiable and strictly convexover (0,∞). The advertising technology features a fixed cost 퐹 - effectively an
entry cost for the firms - and we identify the choice of 훼 = 0 with the decision to
remain inactive, namely we assume that each seller will only bear the fixed cost if
her advertising level is positive and set 푐(0) = 0. Because convexity is not defined
over the whole domain of 푐, ℝ+, a given advertising level 훼′ could be implemented
at a lower cost by a single seller, rather than by two sellers, and 푐 (훼′) < 2 푐 (훼′2 )
can hold if 훼′ is sufficiently small.
퐹 ≡ lim
훼→0
{푐(훼)} > 0.
The first and the second derivative of 푐(훼) are denoted by 푐′(훼) and by 푐′′(훼); we
conveniently assume that
lim
훼→0
{
푐′(훼)
}
= 0, (2)
so that a suitably small, positive advertising level is always optimal, both socially
and privately, if we disregard the fixed cost, and
lim
훼→∞
{
푐′(훼)
}
= ∞.
Our assumptions imply
lim
훼→0
{
푐(훼)
훼
}
= lim
훼→∞
{
푐(훼)
훼
}
= ∞, (3)
and thereby guarantee existence of a unique positive advertising level 훼, featuring
equality between the average cost
푐 ≡ 푐
(
훼
)
훼
(4)
and the marginal cost corresponding to it, which minimizes the cost per unit of
advertising.14
Occasionally, we write the cost function as
푐(훼) = 푐(훼) + 퐹 ,
14Existence of 훼 follows from continuity of 푐(훼)
훼
over ℝ++ and (3). As to uniqueness, if (4) holds
both if 훼 = 훼′ and if 훼 = 훼′′, then strict convexity of 푐(훼) over (0,∞) implies that for any 휆 ∈ (0, 1)
we must have
푐
(
휆 훼′ + (1 − 휆) 훼′′
) ≤ 휆 푐 (훼′) + (1 − 휆) 푐 (훼′′)
= 휆 훼′ 푐 + (1 − 휆) 훼′′ 푐
=
(
휆 훼′ + (1 − 휆) 훼′′
)
푐.
If 훼′ ≠ 훼′′, the inequality would be strict, and the choice of any advertising level 휆 훼′ + (1 − 휆) 훼′′
would be associated with an average cost lower than the minimum cost 푐. Hence, 훼′ must be equal to
훼′′.
Convexity of 푐(훼) over ℝ++ is not sufficient to guarantee existence of a cost-minimizing scale ofadvertising. For example, a cost-minimizing scale does not exist if 푐(훼) = 푏 + 훼 − 훼
훼+1
, if 푏 is a real
number no greater than 1.
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where 푐 ∶ ℝ+ → ℝ+ is the function that expresses the variable cost associated with
푐(훼푠). The advertising technology is assumed to be relatively efficient, in the sensethat (
푣 − 푡
4
)
훼 − 푐
(
훼
)
> 0. (5)
This assumption guarantees that a set of active sellers with positive measure choosing
the most efficient level of advertising can generate a surplus, net of the advertising
costs. Given (4) and convexity of 푐(훼), (5) guarantees that(
푣 − 푡
4
)
훼 − 푐′(훼) > 0 (6)
holds for values of 훼 in a right-neighborhood of 0. Essentially, a positive margin
over the variable cost at low scales of production is required to cover the fixed cost.
Trade takes place subject to mutual agreement. The timing is as follows:
(1) The sellers choose whether to be active, or not, and the active sellers choose
their advertising levels. Each active seller also chooses her address in [0, 1).
(2) The sellers set their prices.
(3) Consumers receive the sellers’ advertisements and decide whether to pur-
chase one of the products for which they received an offer - if any - or to
exit the market without purchasing any product.
Decisions made within each stage are simultaneous. Alternatively, advertising levels
and prices could be chosen simultaneously (i.e., stages (2) and (3) are merged)
with the same outcomes –see the footnote after Proposition 4– but for presentation
purposes the stages are assumed sequential.
All agents are risk-neutral and maximize their expected payoffs. Following Gross-
man and Shapiro (1984) and Christou and Vettas (2008), we focus on pure strategy
symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, which for short we will refer to as equilibria.
Specifically, we consider equilibria in which the sellers are uniformly distributed
around the circle, and all active sellers choose identical advertising intensities and
prices. As we show in Proposition 1, in Section 3, the uniform distribution of the
sellers is a necessary condition for surplus maximization. Definition 1 provides the
operational definition of equilibrium.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is:
(1) An acceptance strategy, used by all buyers, such that a buyer with address
푥 who receives offers from a (finite) set of sellers 푆 accepts the offer of an
arbitrary seller in the set
푆′ ≡ {푠′ ∈ 푆 such that 푣 − 푡 ||푠′ − 푥|| − 푝퐸 ≥ 0 and for each 푠 ∈ 푆,
푣 − 푡 ||푠′ − 푥|| − 푝퐸 ≥ 푣 − 푡 |푠 − 푥| − 푝퐸} ,
including those among the sellers in 푆 whose offers yield the largest positive
net surplus, and to forgo purchasing a product if 푆′ is empty, namely if she
does not receive any offers that would leave her with a positive net surplus.
(2a) In the case of a given mass of active sellers - A profit maximizing ordered
triple
(
훼푠, 푖푠, 푝푠
)
∈ ℝ+ × [0, 1) × ℝ+, for each seller 푠 ∈ Σ, such that
훼푠 > 0 and 푝푠 are identical across sellers, the choices of 푖푠 make the sellers’
population uniformly distributed over [0, 1), and each seller realizes a non-
negative profit.
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(2b) In the case of free entry - The same requirements as in (2a), for the active
sellers, augmented with the requirement that the mass of the active sellers 푚
makes the maximized expected profit equal to 0, and each seller is therefore
indifferent between being active or inactive.
In the analysis of the case of a given number of active sellers, we disregard the
fixed advertising cost 퐹 ; in this scenario, by (2), all firms would choose a strictly
positive advertising level. In the case of free entry, we focus on the strategies of
the active sellers. The identical choices of the advertising level and the price of
the active sellers and their uniform distribution allow us to consider a simplified
representation of their strategies, namely the ordered pair (훼, 푝), where 훼 > 0.
3. SURPLUS MAXIMIZATION
We first consider the problem of assigning to each address an advertising level and
a set of active sellers to maximize the expected surplus generated by the exchanges.
The assignments are expressed by two measurable functions 휌 ∶ [0, 1) → ℝ[0,1)+
and 휇 ∶ [0, 1) → ℝ[0,1)+ . We denote by 휙휌(푥, 푦) the density function of the eventthat the closest seller from whom a buyer at 푥 receives an advertisement - the one
whose product the buyer should consume, if any - is at a distance 푦 from her; we
assume that 휙휌 has the extended set
[
0, 12
]
∪
{
푣
푡
}
as its support, and has a mass
of 1 − 휙휌
(
푥, 12
)
at 푦 = 푣
푡
, corresponding to a utility level of 0. By convexity of
푐(훼) and Jensen’s inequality, all sellers operating at any address 푥 should choose
the same advertising level 휌푥
휇푥
, and hypothetical differences between the aggregate
intensities at different points should only be matched by a suitable distribution of
the sellers. We can then directly write the objective function as
푊 (휌, 휇) = ∫
1
0
(
∫
1
2
0
휙휌(푥, 푦) (푣 − 푡 푦) 푑푦 − 휇푥 푐
(
휌푥
휇푥
))
푑푥, (7)
with the convention that 푐
(
휌푥
휇푥
)
= 0 holds if 휇푥 = 0.
Proposition 1 provides necessary conditions for surplus maximization, along with
a refined expression for the total surplus with its and all others’ proofs in Appendix
A.
Proposition 1. If the distribution of the sellers over the circle is a choice variable,
then surplus maximization is guaranteed if the following conditions are both verified.
I. For any givenmass of active sellers푚, (i) the sellers are uniformly distributed
around the circle, and (ii) (almost) all sellers choose an identical advertising
level.
II. The first- and second-order conditions for maximization of
푤(훼, 푚) = ∫
1
2
0
2 훼 푚푒−2 훼 푚푥 (푣 − 푡푥) 푑푥 − 푚푐(훼)
= (1 − 푒−훼 푚) 푣 + ((훼 푚 + 1) 푒
−훼 푚 − 1) 푡
2 훼 푚
− 푚푐(훼), (8)
w.r.t. the choice variable(s) - 훼 and possibly 푚 - are verified.
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Proposition 2 characterizes the solution to the surplus maximization problem if
the social planner can choose both 푚 and 훼, and if the planner only chooses the
advertising level for each seller, taking the number of the active sellers as given.15 In
both cases, considering Proposition 1, we focus directly on cases featuring a uniform
distribution of the sellers.
Proposition 2.
I. In the solution of the surplus maximization problem
max
(훼,푚)∈ℝ2+
{푤(훼, 푚)}, (9)
the mass of the active sellers is equal to 푚푤, defined as the value of 푚 that
solves
푒−훼 푚
(
푣 +
푡
(
푒훼 푚 − 훼2푚2 − 훼 푚 − 1
)
2 훼 푚2
)
− 푐
(
훼
)
= 0, (10)
and (almost) all active sellers choose an advertising level equal to 훼.
II. In the solution of the surplus maximization problem
max
훼∈ℝ
{푤(훼, 푚)},
for a given mass 푚 > 0 of active sellers, almost all sellers choose an
advertising level 훼푚, defined as the value of 훼 that solves
푒−훼 푚
(
푣푚 +
푡
(
푒훼 푚 − 푎2푚2 − 훼 푚 − 1
)
2 훼2푚
)
− 푚푐′(훼) = 0. (11)
훼푚 is increasing in 푣 and is either increasing or decreasing in 푡, depending
respectively on whether its value is smaller or greater than the value of 훼 that
solves 푒훼 푚−푎2푚2−훼 푚−1 = 0; this equation is verified if 훼 푚 ≈ 1.79, which
corresponds to a probability of approximately 16 that any given consumer
receives no advertisements.
Essentially, if the planner can choose both 훼 and 푚, 훼 is set at the level that
minimizes the unit cost of advertising, and the number of the sellers is chosen based
on the first- and second-order conditions; in the case of an optimum conditional on
a given value of 푚, the advertising level of each seller is chosen based on the first-
and second-order conditions. In the latter case, the optimal advertising level may be
smaller or greater than 훼, depending respectively on whether 푚 is greater or smaller
than 푚푤.The result that 훼푚 increases with 푣 follows directly from the greater expectedpayoff from each advertisement delivered. As to the response of 훼푚 to changes in 푡,there are two effects: An increase in 푡 reduces the expected value of the exchanges
induced by a given advertising level, because the distance between a buyer and
a seller is positive with probability 1; however, it also increases the gain from a
greater advertising level, by potentially allowing each buyer to locate a closer seller.
As a result of this tension, the response of the advertising level to changes in the
transportation cost 푡 depends on the initial level of aggregate advertising. For very
15Grossman and Shapiro (1984) obtain a similar condition: the weighted marginal cost must be
equal to the average cost. In the limit as each firm’s market share goes to zero - as is always the case
here - the two conditions are identical.
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low levels, the consumers are unlikely to receive multiple advertisements; hence,
advertising largely translates into “demand creation”, and welfare is decreasing in
transportation cost 푡. However, as aggregate advertising increases, the chances of
a consumer receiving a second advertisement increases and so the better match
reduces transportation costs.
The turning point corresponds to a probability of about 16 that any given consumerreceives no advertisements (at approximately 훼 푚 = 1.79). The key is whether the
marginal advertisement is likely to be demand creating (so a larger value of 푡 means
a greater cost and less value from demand creation), or match enhancing (so a larger
value of 푡 means greater cost savings from better matches). This turned on whether
the probability a consumer received an advertisement was less or greater than 16 (훼 푚is less or greater than approximately 1.79). So, for example, holding 푚 constant,
if advertising becomes costlier so that the optimal 훼 decreases lowering optimal
aggregate advertising below 1.79, the marginal welfare benefit goes from increasing
in 푡 to decreasing in 푡. Then, an increase in 푡 reduces the optimal advertising level 훼
further.
4. THE PRICING GAME
In this Section, we establish existence of an equilibrium with symmetric prices of
the game played after that all sellers choose the same advertising level 훼̂. We focus
on a “reference seller” with address 0 - with no loss of generality, given symmetry
- and assume that the seller’s competitors all chose the same price 푝̂. The optimal
pricing strategy is independent of the seller’s advertising level 훼, as far as it is
positive (any price would trivially be an optimal price if 훼 = 0).
We denote by
푝푀 ≡ 푣 − 푡2 .
the price set by a hypothetical monopolist, under our assumption that 푣 is sufficiently
large that every buyer is potentially willing to purchase the seller’s product, regardless
of her address. We also introduce two further prices to which we repeatedly refer:
푝 ≡ 푝̂ − 푡
2
, (12)
푝 ≡ 푝̂ + 푡
2
.
If we disregard the possibility of values of 푝 and 푝 greater than the monopoly price
푝푀 , 푝 is the greatest price such that all buyers - except possibly the buyer with
address 12 , faced with an offer for her ideal product - would prefer the offer of ourreference seller to that of any other seller. By contrast, 푝 (≤ 푝푀) is the lowest pricesuch that an offer would only be possibly accepted by the buyers who receive no
other offers - labeled captive buyers.
In Lemma 1, we establish that the price chosen by the reference seller must be
strictly positive and is also subject to a further, possibly tighter lower bound.
Lemma 1. The price that maximizes the expected profit of a seller whose competitors
choose the advertising level 훼̂ and the price 푝̂, is strictly positive and no smaller
than 푝 in (12).
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The results in Lemma 1 essentially follow from the fact that each buyer is a captive
buyer with a positive probability, and from the inelastic demand faced by the seller
for prices lower than 푝.
It is readily verified that the buyers with address 훽 > 푣−푝
푡
, where 푝 is the price of
the reference seller, would not be willing to purchase the seller’s product, regardless
of whether or not they receive other offers. If 푝 ≥ 푣, then the set of the buyers
who do purchase the seller’s product has measure 0, and we can further restrict
attention to prices strictly lower than 푣. Let us then consider any buyer with address
훽 ∈
[
0, 푣−푝
푡
]
- and thus focus on one of the two semi-circles delimited by the address
of the reference seller and by its antipodal address, to fix ideas - and set
푥퐿훽
(
푝, 푝̂
)
= 푝̂ − 푝
푡
,
푥푅훽
(
푝, 푝̂
)
= 2 훽 − 푝̂ − 푝
푡
.
If 푝 ≤ 푝̂, then a buyer would accept an offer from the reference seller if she
received no offers from sellers with addresses in the set
푇 −훽
(
푝, 푝̂
)
=
{
∅, if 훽 < 푝̂−푝
푡
,(
푥퐿훽
(
푝, 푝̂
)
, 푥푅훽
(
푝, 푝̂
))
, if 훽 ≥ 푝̂−푝
푡
.
(13a)
Basically, if the reference seller charges a price lower than that of her competitors,
the buyers with higher valuations for her product would choose her offer regardless
of what other offers, if any, they receive (first line of (13a)). For values of 푝 greater
than p, some buyers would rather purchase the products of sellers closer to them,
the price differential notwithstanding (second line of (13a)); the number of these
sellers increases with the buyer’s distance from the reference seller. In the case of
buyers with address 훽 in
(
1
2 , 1
)
, the values of the variables corresponding to 푥퐿훽
and 푥푅훽 are the same as those in (13a), except for the sign. Similar remarks apply inthe case of (13b) below. Notice that because the probability of an offer from a seller
with any given address is equal to 0, we consider open intervals of addresses with
no consequence on the results.
If 푝 ≥ 푝̂, then a buyer with address 훽 would accept the offer of our reference seller
if she received no offers from sellers with addresses in the set
푇 +훽
(
푝, 푝̂
)
=
{(
푥퐿훽
(
푝, 푝̂
)
, 푥푅훽
(
푝, 푝̂
))
, if 훽 ≤ 12 − 푝−푝̂푡 ,
[0, 1), if 훽 > 12 − 푝−푝̂푡 .
(13b)
The interval in the first line of (13b) is identical to that in the second line of (13a).
In the case of the second line of (13b), only the captive buyers would accept an offer
from the reference seller, given the distance and the high price of the product.
Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c illustrate the different possible scenarios. Unless the
interval with the potentially preferred sellers engulfs the whole circle, its boundaries
are symmetric around the buyer’s address. If 푝 = 푝̂, then the length of the interval is
equal to twice the distance between the buyer and the reference seller. If 푝 < 푝̂, the
interval is shorter, and its length is equal to 0 for buyers suitably close to the seller;
conversely, if 푝 > 푝̂, the interval is generally longer, and fully covers the circle in
the case of buyers far away from the seller.
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(A) The case of 푝 < 푝̂. (B) The case of 푝 = 푝̂.
(C) The case of 푝 > 푝̂. (D) Probability of
trade as a function
of the distance be-
tween the seller and
the buyer.
FIGURE 1. Parts 1a, 1b, and 1c illustrate the sets of the addresses
of the sellers whose products, offered at 푝̂, would be preferred to the
product of a seller located at the top of the circle. Part 1d illustrates
the probability of trade as a function of the distance between the
seller and the buyer, in an example with 훼 = 2, 푚 = 1 and 푡 = 1.
The probability 푞푦 that our reference buyer will receive no offers from sellers in
an interval (−푦, 0] or [0, 푦), where 푦 ∈
[
0, 12
)
, obeys the differential equation
푑푞푦
푑푦
= −훼 푚 푞푦.
By integrating both sides of the equation and using the boundary condition 푞0 = 1, wecan immediately establish that the complementary event of receiving advertisements
from one or more sellers at a distance smaller than 푦 is exponentially distributed,
with parameter 훼 푚.
By using (13), we can then write the “twin” demand functions for positive prices
satisfying 푝̂ < 푝푀 and 푝 ∈
(
푝, 푝
)
- so that the reference seller can potentially sell
her product even to the antipodal buyers who do not receive better offers - as:
퐷−
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
= 2훼
(
∫
푝̂−푝
푡
0
푑훽 + ∫
1
2
푝̂−푝
푡
푒−2훼̂ 푚
(
훽− 푝̂−푝푡
)
푑훽
)
= 훼
(2
푡
(
푝̂ − 푝
)
+ 1
훼̂ 푚
(
1 − 푒
2 훼̂ 푚
푡 (푝̂−푝)−훼̂ 푚
))
, (14a)
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if 푝 ∈ [푝, 푝̂], and as
퐷+
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
= 2훼
(
∫
1
2−
푝−푝̂
푡
0
푒−2훼̂ 푚
(
훽− 푝̂−푝푡
)
푑훽 + ∫
1
2
1
2−
푝−푝̂
푡
푒−훼̂ 푚푑훽
)
= 훼
(
1
훼̂ 푚
(
푒
2 훼̂ 푚
푡 (푝̂−푝) − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
+ 2푒
−훼̂ 푚
푡
(
푝 − 푝̂
))
. (14b)
if 푝 ∈ [푝̂,min{푝, 푝푀}]. As in the case of the profit equations (15) below, bothexpressions cover the case of 푝 = 푝̂; the candidate optimal, symmetric price that we
are targeting coincides with 푝̂.
Figure 1d can help us to interpret the expressions for the probability of acceptance
of an advertisement as a function of the distance between the seller and the buyer,
used in the integrands of (14a) and in (14b). The blue, the orange and the green
curve are referred to the cases of 푝 > 푝̂, 푝 = 푝̂ and 푝 < 푝̂. The expression for the
expected profit of our reference seller at an interior equilibrium is then
휋
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
=
{
휋−
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
, if 푝 ∈ [푝, 푝̂) ,
휋+
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
, if 푝 ∈ [푝̂,min{푝, 푝푀}] ,
where
휋−
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
= 푝퐷−
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
, (15a)
휋+
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
= 푝퐷+
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
, (15b)
and the problem correspondingly faced by the seller is
max
푝∈ℝ
{
휋
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)}
,
where 훼, 훼̂, 푚 and 푝̂ are taken as given.
Lemma 2 establishes that the optimal price set by a seller responding to the choice
of 푝̂ by her competitors is also bounded above by the monopoly price 푝푀 .
Lemma 2. A seller who was forced to choose a price no smaller than min{푝, 푝푀},
if all other sellers choose an advertising level 훼̂ and a price 푝̂ < 푝푀 , would maximize
her profit by choosing the monopoly price 푝푀 .
Lemma 2 allows us to conclude that a symmetric equilibrium price can be equal
either to 푝푀 or to a price strictly lower than 푝푀 . It also justifies both the assumptionof prices no greater than the monopoly price, and therefore the procedure used to
derive (13), (14) and (15).
We are now ready to characterize the symmetric price equilibrium, in Proposition
3.
Proposition 3. If
훼̂ 푚 > log(2) (16)
and 푣 ≤ ◦푣 (훼̂, 푚, 푡), where16
◦푣
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
= 푡
2
(
1 + 푒
훼̂ 푚 − 1
훼̂2푚2
)
, (17)
16It is straightforward to show there always exist values of 푣 such that 푡 ≤ 푣 ≤ ◦푣, i.e., that
the covered market assumption plus the upper bound on 푣 does not eliminate the monopolistically
competitive equilibrium. The condition simplifies to (훼̂ 푚)2 + 1 < 푒훼̂ 푚, which is always verified.
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then the symmetric equilibrium price and profit gross of advertising costs are
◦푝
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
= 푡
2 훼̂ 푚
, (18)
◦휋
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
=
훼 푡
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
2 훼̂2푚2
. (19)
Condition (16) is perhaps more easily interpreted as the probability a given
consumer receives an advertisement is no smaller than 푒−2 log(2)2 = 12 . As in Salop(1979); Grossman and Shapiro (1984), the monopolistically competitive price does
not increase with 푣, albeit the monopoly price does.
The conditions for a monopolistically competitive equilibrium (16) and (17) rule
out deviating to the monopoly price as a best response. Condition (16) ensures a
sufficiently large probability that any customer receives multiple advertisements,
and thereby a sufficiently intense level of competition. Condition (17) guarantees
that the largest valuation 푣 and therefore the monopoly price is not too much greater
than the equilibrium price (since in the Salop model the equilibrium price does not
depend on 푣). Aggregate advertising 훼푚 has two opposite effects on this condition.
First, increases in aggregate advertising increase competition thereby decreasing
the equilibrium price making a deviation to the monopoly price more attractive;
however, it also makes it less likely that a consumer reached by a firm is not reached
by any other firm, and thus less likely a captive customer, making the monopoly
price less attractive. As it turns out, the largest value of 푣 compatible with an interior
equilibrium in (17) is at first decreasing and then increasing in aggregate advertising
훼 푚, depending respectively on whether 훼 푚 is smaller or greater than approximately
1.59.
As one goal of this paper is to extend Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and gain
new insights, a critical question is whether or not our assumptions are introducing
spurious results via effects that do not exist in Grossman and Shapiro (1984). One
check is how the equilibrium prices compare and indeed the price in (18) has the
same limiting properties. As the advertising level 훼 grows, and we ideally approach
perfect information, the price approaches the competitive price; an increase in the
mass of the active sellers produces the same effect. The profit gross of advertising
costs in (19) shares the same properties.
We close the present Section by recalling that as in previous work, the covered
market and unit demand assumptions make the symmetric equilibrium price in (18)
consistent with surplus maximization.
5. THE ADVERTISING GAME
5.1. Equilibrium Existence. We now move back to the stage in which the active
sellers, representing a set with mass 푚, simultaneously choose their advertising
intensities, correctly anticipating a monopolistically competitive equilibrium in the
pricing stage. Using (19), we can express each seller’s problem as
max
훼∈ℝ+
{
Π
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푡
)}
,
where
Π
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
= ◦휋
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
− 푐(훼). (20)
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By convexity of 푐(훼), the first order condition
휕Π
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
휕훼
=
푡
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 − 푐′(훼)
= 0. (21)
guarantees an interior optimum. Moreover, for any given positive 푚, (2) and positiv-
ity of 푡
(
1−푒−훼̂ 푚
)
2(훼̂ 푚)2
for any 훼̂ > 0 guarantee existence of a best response to any choice
of 훼̂ by the competitors. A candidate symmetric equilibrium advertising level is
thus a value of 훼̂ such that17
퐻
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
=
휕Π
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
휕훼
|||||훼=훼̂
= 0. (22)
Letting the first partial derivative of퐻 (훼̂, 푚, 푡) w.r.t. 훼̂ be denoted by퐻훼̂ (훼̂, 푚, 푡),we have
Lemma 3. The partial derivative퐻훼̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
is negative.
Negativity of퐻훼̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
) guarantees uniqueness of the value of 훼̂ defined by (22),
and thus generally allows us to use the Implicit Function Theorem in our analysis.
Proposition 4. For any positive value of 푚, (21) defines a unique value of 훼̂, de-
noted by 푎(푚). If 푎(푚) and 푚, along with 푡 and 푣, satisfy the conditions in (16)
and (17), then there exists a unique symmetric monopolistically competitive pair(
푎(푚), ◦푝 (푎(푚), 푚, 푡)
)
, for ◦푝
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
defined in (18).18
The comparative statics of our model are all consistent with those in Grossman
and Shapiro (1984), including the possibility that an increase in advertising costs
can increase profit, suggesting that the underlying mechanisms at work are the
same; we thus refer to Grossman and Shapiro (1984) for a general discussion on
the comparative statics and present the derivations in Appendix B. However, the
comparative statics allow the existence conditions (16) and (17) to be expressed in
terms of the exogenous advertising and transportation costs. First, an increase in
transportation cost 푡 increases both the equilibrium price and aggregate advertising,
and thereby relaxes the equilibrium conditions (16) and (17).19 Note that while by
itself an increase in aggregate advertising would decrease the equilibrium price,
the direct effect of transportation cost 푡 dominates. As a result, ◦푣 (훼̂, 푚, 푡) in (17)
increases monotonically in 푡. Second, the effect of an increase in advertising costs
tightens condition (16) as it reduces aggregate advertising (푎(푚)푚). The effect on
condition (17) is more complex, reflecting the non-monotonic effect of aggregate
advertising. That is, because increases in advertising costs decrease aggregate
17This is equivalent to condition (11b) in Grossman and Shapiro (1984), once one substitutes for
their price in (11a).
18As noted in Section 2, although advertising and then price levels are chosen sequentially, this
is also the equilibrium with the levels chosen simultaneously since the expected revenue per unit of
advertising level is independent of 훼. As a result, the cross-partial derivative of the profit evaluated at
훼̂ and ◦푝 is zero, and so profits are locally concave in the two variables.
19Of course, it eventually binds against the covered market assumption.
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advertising, and decreases in aggregate advertising first tighten and then relaxes
the second condition (17), so too do increases in advertising costs first tighten and
then relaxes the second condition (17). Both points are illustrated by the example in
Section 7 below.
5.2. Welfare Comparison in the Advertising Stage. Having established that our
model is consistent with Grossman and Shapiro (1984), we turn to examine how the
monopolistically competitive outcome for a given mass of firms 푚 compares to the
social outcome.
We find that advertising is always socially insufficient (recall that with unit demand
and the market covered assumption, the price has no welfare effect though in that
sense the following proposition is a second-best statement). That is, the welfare gain
from better matching always outweighs the capture effect even when the demand
creation effect is negligible.
Proposition 5. For a fixed value of 푚, the symmetric monopolistically competitive
equilibrium has too little advertising compared to the social optimum.
Remark 1. The proof of Proposition 5 establishes a more general result: for a
fixed value of 푚, the marginal social benefit per firm from increasing advertising
is greater than the marginal private benefit of each firm. Thus, e.g., at the socially
optimal level of entry, there is too little advertising.
Given the findings in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) – who find that there is always
excessive adverting – our result of insufficient advertising is initially surprising. As
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) make clear, though, their results are for when every
consumer receives a least one advertisement so there is no demand creation effect
there (as there is here). As a firm does not capture the entire surplus from demand
creation, having the demand creation effect could be sufficient to reverse the results
and have society wanting the firms to advertise more and indeed Christou and
Vettas (2008) report that when there is demand creation in Grossman and Shapiro
(1984) (i.e., some consumers receive no advertisements), then there can be socially
insufficient advertising.
However, our result is for all equilibria including ones in which there is very
little demand creation (i.e., each consumer receives at least one advertisement
with probability close to one). There are intuitive reasons for this result, since
as Grossman and Shapiro (1984) noted, with incomplete information each firm is
potentially competing not only for nearby consumers as in the complete information
Salop model, but also for far away consumers who would find the firm’s product a
bad match. This competitive pattern forces down the price and the firms’ private
return to advertising. In addition, with the continuum of sellers here there is always
the potential for a competing seller to be arbitrarily close, while in Grossman and
Shapiro (1984) there is always a gap between sellers so the firms here have less
market power and so lower prices. Second, the assumption in Grossman and Shapiro
(1984) that every consumer receives at least one ad implies that every consumer
is very likely to receive ads from two or more firms. As a result, the marginal
advertisement does not have a large improvement in match/expected transportation
costs and themarginal reduction in transportation costs from another advertisement is
smaller in the approximation than the exact expression when their assumption holds
(i.e., the number of firms is large or the probability of receiving an advertisement is
large). That is, even ignoring the elimination of the demand creation effect, their
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assumption makes the social return to advertising smaller than it is. Finally, the
analysis in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) restricts the set of possible deviation prices,
i.e., it is assumed that a firm cannot deviate up to the monopoly price or down to the
supercompetitive price. As we have shown here, the condition for the former to hold
here is not irrelevant and so including it in the analysis of the Grossman and Shapiro
(1984) model could affect the conclusions there. Likewise, allowing the firm to
deviate to the supercompetitive price in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) could affect
their conclusions. For example, in the benchmark case of the numerical analysis
in Grossman and Shapiro (1984), it seems that a deviation to the supercompetitive
price (which they do not allow) is more profitable than their equilibrium price.
6. THE ENTRY GAME
6.1. Equilibrium Existence. In this section we move back to the beginning of the
game to determine the measure 푚 of the set of the active firms under free entry.
Given our assumption of a large set of potential sellers, equilibrium requires the
size of this set to make the expected profit of all sellers - at the optimal advertising
level 푎(푚) and net of the advertising costs, if active - equal to 0. Formally, we must
have20
Π∗(퐹 ,푚, 푡) = 푡 (1 − 푒
−푎(푚)푚)
2 푎(푚)푚2
− 푐(푎(푚)) − 퐹 = 0, (23)
where the advertising costs are expressed as the sum of the fixed cost 퐹 and the
variable cost 푐 (푎(푚)).
We start the equilibrium analysis with Lemma 4, focusing on the effects of the
measure of the set of the active sellers on the level of advertising chosen by each
firm in equilibrium. In Lemma 4, as in the case of the other results stated in the
present Section, we refer to scenarios featuring a positive mass of active seller 푚.
Notice also that (2) guarantees a strictly positive level of 푎(푚), in any scenario.
Lemma 4. The equilibrium advertising level 푎(푚) is a strictly decreasing and
differentiable function of the size of the set of the active sellers 푚.
Lemma 4 is intuitively straightforward: if the incumbents maintained a constant
level of advertising in the face of entry of new firms, then each incumbent’s marginal
benefit from advertising would decrease due to increased competition; the advertising
level must thus drop to achieve a new equilibrium.
Lemma 5 states that the expected profit of each firm decreases as the mass of the
active sellers increases.
Lemma 5. Each firm’s expected profit is a strictly decreasing and differentiable
function of the size of the set of the active sellers 푚.
The result in Lemma 5 expresses the balance of two opposite effects. A greater
number of sellers have a direct, negative effect on the profit of each firm, via more
intense competition; however, it also has an indirect, positive effect via the lower
advertising level chosen by each firm, given Lemma 4. As it turns out, strict convexity
of 푐(훼) is a sufficient condition for a negative net effect. Lemma 6 states that an
increase in 푚 results in an increase in the aggregate level 푎(푚)푚, the decrease in
each firm’s advertising level notwithstanding.
20This is condition (11c) in Grossman and Shapiro (1984).
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Lemma 6. The aggregate advertising level 푎(푚)푚 is strictly increasing and differ-
entiable in 푚.
Lemma 7 focuses on the response of the measure of the set of the active sellers to
changes in the fixed cost 퐹 .
Lemma 7. The size of the set of the active sellers is a strictly decreasing and
differentiable function of the fixed cost 퐹 , denoted by 푚∗(퐹 ).
We can then state our existence result for the case of free entry in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Let 훼̂′ denote the unique value of the advertising level 훼̂ that solves
푡
4 log(2)2
− 푐′
(
훼̂
)
= 0. (24)
Then if the fixed cost 퐹 satisfies 퐹 < 퐹 ′, where
퐹 ′ = 훼̂
′ 푡
4 log(2)2
− 푐
(
훼̂′
)
> 0, (25)
the model with free entry has a unique, symmetric monopolistically competitive
equilibrium.
As with exogenous 푚, the comparative statics with endogenous 푚 are in line with
those of Grossman and Shapiro (1984); the general characteristics of the model are
in line with theirs. The proofs are in Appendix B. In particular, an increase in costs,
specifically a multiplicative increase, may boost profits and thereby boost entry. This
possibility is illustrated in the example considered in Section 7.
6.2. Welfare Comparison in the Entry Stage. Given the market level of entry
and the corresponding equilibrium advertising level, would the planner encourage
or discourage entry? Despite entry not having the positive welfare effect of reducing
the average distance for consumers, whereas in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) it
does have this positive effect, we find that there is always insufficient entry, much
like there is insufficient advertising for fixed 푚 in Proposition 5.
Proposition 7. The symmetric monopolistically competitive equilibrium has too
little entry compared to the social optimum.
As in the case of Proposition 5, the result is more general: for any fixed 훼
(including the one selected by the planner), the planner would choose a level of
entry greater than that corresponding to the market equilibrium. Alternatively, if
the firms were forced to advertise at the efficient level, there would be fewer active
firms than is socially optimal.
The proof of the Proposition reveals that the underlying mechanism is the same as
for Proposition 5. This is because the planner’s problem could be viewed as choosing
the optimal aggregate advertising 훼 푚 in (9) subject to minimizing costs through
entry and advertising levels since entry has no direct effect on the average distance
consumers incur in buying their product. As the costs are the same to the firms
as to society, the question is only if the social benefit of the marginal increase in
aggregate advertising is greater or smaller than the private benefit. Since the social
benefit was greater when the choice was advertising level for fixed entry, then it is
greater when the choice is entry for a fixed advertising level, as that too increases
aggregate advertising. Proposition 7 may initially seem surprising since generally
in strategic models there is excessive rather than insufficient entry (Mankiw and
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Whinston, 1986). However, in the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model there could be
too little entry depending on the consumers’ preferences.
7. AN EXAMPLE
To provide some further understanding of the results, we investigate an example
in which the advertising costs, at the firm level, is expressed by the function
푐휒 (훼) =
휒 훼2
4
+ 퐹 ,
for given parameters 휒 and 퐹 inℝ++. In a symmetric equilibrium, each firm choosesits advertising level 훼 to maximize its profit
Π휒
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
= 훼 푡
2훼̂2푚2
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
−
휒 훼2
4
− 퐹 .
Convexity of the cost function guarantees that the first order condition for an optimum
in (21), which reads
휕Π휒
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
휕훼
=
푡
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
2훼̂2푚2
−
휒 훼
2
= 0,
identifies an optimal choice of 훼 for each firm. Setting 훼 = 훼̂, we can then obtain
the condition for the candidate monopolistically competitive equilibrium value of
the advertising level:
푡
2훼̂2푚2
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
−
휒 훼̂
2
= 0. (26)
Inspection of the LHS of (26) reveals that for any given value of 푚, there exists a
unique, positive value of 훼̂ which is potentially compatible with an equilibrium, and
which does qualify as an equilibrium if (16) and (17) are verified.
In Figure 2a, we plot the values of the main endogenous variables for values
of the cost parameter 휒 between 0 and 0.9 - which approximately coincides with
the largest value of 휒 for which the aggregate advertising level is no smaller than
log(2), as required by (16). Larger values of the cost parameter correspond to a
lower advertising level and thus to higher prices, given the greater probability that
any buyer reached by a seller will not receive other advertisements. The balance of
the effect of the reduced competition and the lower marked coverage is such that the
sellers’ profits increase with the advertising cost parameter. The greatest value of the
preference parameter 푣 compatible with equilibrium existence, ◦푣, is only affected by
changes in the cost parameter via the equilibrium advertising level, and its response
follows the pattern indicated in the discussion of (17).
In the case of free entry, under our assumption that the number of potential sellers
is sufficiently large that some potential sellers choose not to be active, an equilibrium
is a pair (훼̂, 푚) that solves the system comprised of (26) and the zero profit-condition
Π휒
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푡
)|||훼=훼̂ = 0,
Figures 2d, 2b, and Figure 2c respectively illustrate the responses of the main
endogenous variables in cases of changes in the fixed cost 퐹 , changes in the variable
cost parameter 휒 and proportional changes in the two parameters. As in the case of
Figure 2a, the plot covers a set of values of the parameters such that (16) is verified.
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(A) Different values
of the (variable) cost
parameter with an
exogenous mass of
active sellers.
(B) Different values
of the fixed cost pa-
rameter with an en-
dogenous mass of
active sellers.
(C) Different values
of the variable cost
parameter with an
endogenous mass of
active sellers.
(D) Different values
of both the fixed and
the variable cost pa-
rameter with an en-
dogenous mass of
active sellers.
FIGURE 2
The non-monotonic response of ◦푣 persists in the face of changes of both 훼 and 푚
induced by changes in the cost parameters with free entry. If only one of the cost
parameters changes, then the changes in 훼 and 푚 take opposite directions. Identical
proportional increases of both parameters do not affect the advertising level, in the
specific case of a quadratic cost function, and reduce the size of the set of the active
firms.
8. CONCLUSION
We have introduced a tractable model that captures the essence of Grossman
and Shapiro (1984), without approximations or the requirement that essentially
every consumer receives at least one advertisement. The model also accounts for
the possibility of non-existence of the monopolistically competitive equilibrium
(Christou and Vettas, 2008) from either deviating up to the monopoly price or
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deviating down to the supercompetitive price of Salop. Tractability, achieved by
modeling both the buyers’ and the sellers’ population as a continuum, allowed us to
provide explicit conditions for the monopolistically competitive equilibrium to hold.
In addition to the theoretical contributions, we obtain new insights. In particular,
one inference of Grossman and Shapiro (1984) is that when in equilibrium nearly
all consumers receive at least one ad, there must be excessive advertising. However,
we show that in our model even when nearly all consumers receive at least one
ad, there is still socially too little advertising. In fact, there always is insufficient
socially insufficient advertising in the pure strategy symmetric monopolistically
competitive equilibrium rather than excessive advertising, a result that could be
viewed as extending a general finding in models with homogeneous goods (Butters
(1977), Stahl (1994), Stegeman (1991)) to heterogeneous goods. The intuition comes
from Grossman and Shapiro (1984): with incomplete information competition is no
longer localized, as is the case in the full information setting of Salop (1979). That
is, here the firm not only competes for consumers with its nearest neighbor (as in
Salop) but also for consumers far away, and so may face a rival with a good match
for the consumer. This extra competition reduces the equilibrium price. As our
model (like its predecessors) assumes unit demand and covered market, it eliminates
a potentially positive effect from advertising: more advertising results in lower
prices (what Grossman and Shapiro (1984) call the quantity demanded effect). This
suggests, that, if anything, the models may be underestimating the extent informative
advertising is socially insufficient.
We then endogenize entry, finding that there is socially insufficient entry rather
than socially excessive entry as found in Grossman and Shapiro (1984) even though
here entry does not have the direct social benefit of reducing transportation costs
(i.e., better matches) that exists in Grossman and Shapiro (1984). The reason there is
too little entry is, as advertising has convex costs, entry is a second tool to “produce”
advertising and so the planner chooses entry and advertising levels to minimize
costs for a given level of aggregate advertising. That is, just like the firm does not
capture the full social value of the marginal increase in advertising, the firm does
not capture the full social value of entry on aggregate advertising. This result is in
contrast to the standard result of excessive entry even though business stealing –one
firm’s sale often comes at the expense of another firm– is present. However, in the
seminal monopolistic-competitive model Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) find there can be
too little or too much entry.
Finally, the tractability of our model allows for new questions to be asked within
the framework, which, can therefore, be a valuable tool for further analysis. From
this point of view, the framework can allow us to extend the analysis of the paper in
future research without encountering the difficulties that are present in Grossman
and Shapiro (1984), whereby the main results are derived by using approximations
that among other things rule out demand creation. Likewise, although Christou
and Vettas (2008) provide many insights, their analysis could not be extended to
endogenizing entry nor were explicit conditions derived for the equilibrium.
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APPENDIX A. PROOFS
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1.
Part I. We first show that if the assignment 휌 were subject to the constraint of a
given total advertising level 푅 ∈ ℝ++, written as
∫
1
0
휌(푠) 푑푠 ≤ 푅, (A.1)
and we disregarded the advertising costs, then surplus maximization would require
an identical advertising level across (almost) all addresses in [0, 1). Let Ψ휌(푥, 푠)denote the probability that a buyer with address 푥 will not receive an advertisement
from any sellers with address in (푥 − 푠, 푥 + 푠), under a generic assignment 휌; if
necessary, all distributions considered here can be completed by including a point
with positive mass that corresponds to a utility level of 0, as in the case of 휙휌 in (7).For each buyer, receiving advertisements from multiple sellers at the same distance
푠 has probability 0, and the dynamics of Ψ휌(푥, 푠) is expressed by the differentialequation
푑Ψ휌(푥, 푠)
푑푠
= −(휌(푥 − 푠) + 휌(푥 + 푠)) Ψ휌(푥, 푠).
By integrating both sides of the previous equation and using the initial condition
Ψ휌(푥, 푥) = 1, we obtain
Ψ휌(푥, 휉) = 푒− ∫
휉
푥 (휌(푥−푠)+휌(푥+푠)) 푑푠. (A.2)
Under the given uniform distribution of the buyers, convexity of Ψ휌(푥, 휉), viewed asa function of the integral in (A.2), implies via Jensen’s inequality that the probability
of receiving no advertisements from sellers at distances no greater than 휉, averaged
across buyers, is minimized if Ψ휌(푥, 휉) is independent of the buyer’s address 푥. As(A.1) should hold as an equality, this requirement is in turn satisfied if the advertising
level is equal to 푅 for (almost) every 푠 ∈ [0, 1). Setting Ψ휌(휉) = ∫ 10 Ψ푟(푥, 휉) 푑푥,and using 휌 = 푟 to denote the uniform assignment, we thus have
Ψ푟(휉) ≤ Ψ휌(휉) (A.3)
where strict inequality holds in the presence of differences with positive measure
between 휌 and 푟 over any subinterval of
[
0, 12
)
.
Because receiving and not receiving an advertisement from a seller within any
distance 푦 are complementary events, we can set 휙휌(푥, 푠) = −휓휌(푥, 푠), where
휓휌(푥, 푠) =
푑Ψ휌(푥,푠)
푑푠
is the density function associated with Ψ휌(푥, 푠), and 휓휌(푠) =
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∫ 10 휓휌(푥, 푠) 푑푥, and rewrite the expected total surplus as
∫
1
0
(
∫
1
2
0
휙휌(푥, 푠) (푣 − 푡 푠) 푑푠
)
푑푥 = ∫
1
2
0
(
∫
1
0
휙휌(푥, 푠) (푣 − 푡 푠) 푑푥
)
푑푠
= ∫
1
2
0
(
∫
1
0
(
−휓휌(푥, 푠)
)
(푣 − 푡 푠) 푑푥
)
푑푠
= ∫
1
2
0
(
−(푣 − 푡 푠) ∫
1
0
휓휌(푥, 푠) 푑푥
)
푑푠
= −∫
1
2
0
(푣 − 푡 푠)휓휌(푠) 푑푠.
Integration by parts allows us to further work out the previous expression as follows:
−∫
1
2
0
(푣 − 푡 푠)휓휌(푠) 푑푠 = − (푣 − 푡 푠) Ψ휌(푠)
||| 120 − 푡 ∫
1
2
0
푡Ψ휌(푠) 푑푠
= 푣 −
(
푣 − 푡
2
)
Ψ휌
(1
2
)
− 푡 ∫
1
2
0
Ψ휌(푠) 푑푠,
whereΨ휌(푠) = ∫ 휓휌(푠) 푑푠. We can then establish that the surplus under the uniformassignment 푟 is no smaller than the surplus under a generic assignment 휌 by noting
that Ψ푟
(
1
2
) ≤ Ψ휌 ( 12) and (A.3) imply
∫
1
0
(
∫
1
2
0
휙푟(푥, 푠) (푣 − 푡 푠) 푑푠
)
푑푥 − ∫
1
0
(
∫
1
2
0
휙푟(푥, 푠) (푣 − 푡 푠) 푑푠
)
푑푥
=
(
푣 − 푡
2
) (
Ψ휌
(1
2
)
− Ψ푟
(1
2
))
+ 푡
(
∫
1
2
0
Ψ휌(푠) 푑푠 − ∫
1
2
0
Ψ휌(푠) 푑푠
)
≥ 0.
To minimize the total advertising costs with a given mass 푚 of active sellers, all
sellers should choose the same advertising level. The minimized total cost of any
admissible assignment 휌 for a given mass 푚 of active sellers is then achieved by
setting 휇푥 = 푚휌푥푅 for each address 푥 ∈ [0, 1), and is equal to 푅푐
(
푅
푚
)
. Optimality
of the uniform assignment, therefore, persists even if the surplus levels net of the
minimized cost are considered.
Part II. As we know from Part I, the cost of implementing the uniform assignment
푟 is minimized if 휇푥 = 푚푅푅 = 푚 holds for every 푥 ∈ [0, 1). Setting 휌푥 = 훼 푚 in(A.2), for every 푥 ∈ [0, 1), we can express 1 − Ψ∗푟 (푥, 휉), the cumulative distributionof the distance from the seller with whom any buyer is matched, as an exponential
distribution with parameter 2 훼 푚, which in turn allows us to obtain (8) from (7).
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2. As mentioned in the text, we build on Proposition 1
and focus directly on cases in which the sellers are uniformly distributed over [0, 1).
Part I. (10) expresses the first order condition for maximization of 푤 (훼, 푚) w.r.t. 푚
if each seller chooses the optimal scale of production 훼, which is independent of 푚.
The LHS of (5) is the limit of the LHS of (10) as푚→ 0, and its positivity guarantees
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existence of a value of 푚 at which both (10) and the second order-condition for an
optimal choice are verified.
Part II. (11) expresses the first order condition for maximization of 푤 (훼, 푚) w.r.t. 훼
for a given mass 푚 of sellers, and (6) guarantees positivity of the limit of its LHS
for conveniently small values of 훼. Continuity of 휕푤(훼,푚)
휕훼
allows then us to conclude
that there must then exist a positive value of 훼 for which the first and second order
conditions for the planner’s problem are verified.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 1. As each buyer who receives an advertisement is a captive
buyer with probability 푒−훼̂ 푚, the reference seller can realize an expected profit equal
to 훼 푒−훼̂ 푚 푝′ > 0 by charging a price 푝′ ∈ (0, 푝푀). Both the optimized profit andthe price allowing the seller to achieve it must, therefore, be positive as well.
Moreover, if the reference seller set her price equal to 푝 > 0, then each advertise-
ment delivered would lead to a transaction, and the seller’s expected profit would
be equal to 훼 푝. By contrast, any alternative (positive) price 푝′′ < 푝 would yield an
expected profit of 훼 푝′′ < 훼 푝, and its choice would, therefore, be dominated by the
choice of 푝.
A.4. Proof of Lemma 2. We consider separately the cases of 푝 ≤ 푝푀 and 푝 > 푝푀 .If 푝 ≤ 푝푀 , then a price no lower than 푝 can only possibly be accepted by the captivebuyers. Hence, the result follows from the fact that 푝푀 is the unique solution to themonopoly pricing problem that the seller would correspondingly face.
If 푝 > 푝푀 , then the reference seller could out-compete the more distant sellerswith a positive probability, albeit the buyers at a distance greater than 푣−푝
푡
would
not purchase her product even if they were captive buyers. The expected demand if
푝 ∈
(
푝푀 , 푝
) and its first derivative are then
퐷
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
= 2훼
(
∫
1
2−
푝−푝̂
푡
0
푒−2 훼̂ 푚
(
훽− 푝̂−푝푡
)
푑훽 + ∫
푣−푝
푡
1
2−
푝−푝̂
푡
푒−훼̂ 푚푑훽
)
= 훼
훼̂ 푚 푡
(
2 훼̂ 푚 푒−훼̂ 푚
(
푣 − 푝̂
)
+ 푡
(
푒
2 훼̂ 푚
푡 (푝̂−푝) − 푒−훼̂ 푚
(
훼̂ 푚 + 1
)))
,
(A.4)
휕퐷
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
휕푝
= −2 훼 푒
2 훼̂ 푚
푡 (푝̂−푝)
푡
.
Since the derivative is negative, increases of 푝 above 푝푀 lead to a lower profit, andalso, in this case, 푝푀 is an optimal choice in the interval
[
푝푀 , 푝
].
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3. The first derivatives of the profit equations in (15)
are
휕휋−
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
휕푝
= 훼
(
2
푡
(
푝̂ − 2푝
)
+ 1
훼̂ 푚
+ 푒
2훼̂ 푚
푡 (푝̂−푝)−훼̂ 푚
(
2푝
푡
− 1
훼̂ 푚
))
,
(A.5)
휕휋+
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
휕푝
= 훼
(
푒−훼̂ 푚
(2
푡
(
2푝 − 푝̂
)
− 1
훼̂ 푚
)
+ 푒
2훼̂ 푚
푡 (푝̂−푝)
(
1
훼̂ 푚
− 2푝
푡
))
.
(A.6)
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(A.5) and (A.6), evaluated at 푝 = 푝̂, are respectively the left- and the right-derivative
of the seller’s profit at the symmetric equilibrium price, and the necessary conditions
for 푝 = 푝̂ to be a best response to the competitors’ choice of 푝̂ are
휕휋−
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
휕푝
|||||푝=푝̂ = 0, (A.7)
휕휋+
(
훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡
)
휕푝
|||||푝=푝̂ = 0. (A.8)
Both (A.7) and (A.8) are verified iff 푝̂ is expressed by ◦푝 (훼̂, 푚, 푡) in (18). It is
also readily verified that 훼̂ 푚 > log(2) is equivalent to negativity of the second
derivative of 휋+ (훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡) at 푝 = ◦푝 (훼̂, 푚, 푡); 훼̂ 푚 > log(2) also guarantees a
negative second derivative of 휋− (훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡), and thereby ensures local profit
maximization.
As to other possible profit maximizing prices, separately considered, if the seller’s
competitors set their prices equal to ◦푝, (A.7) also holds at 푝 = 푝−, where
푝− = 푡
2훼̂ 푚
(
1 − 훼̂ 푚 − log(2)
)
, (A.9)
This price can however be disregarded, as (A.9) and 훼̂ 푚 > log(2) imply
푝− < 푡
2훼̂ 푚
(1 − 2 log(2)) < 0.
(A.8) also admits a further real solution at 푝 = 푝+, where
푝+ = 푡
2훼̂ 푚
(1 + 훼̂ 푚 − log(2)), (A.10)
However, evaluation of the second derivative reveals that if 훼̂ 푚 > log(2), then
푝 = 푝+ yields a local minimum of 휋+ (훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡).
Even if 훼̂ 푚 > log(2), we must still consider the possibility of non-interior best
responses to the competitors’ choice of 푝 = ◦푝 before concluding that ◦푝 is a symmetric
equilibrium price. For prices below ◦푝, the fact that 푝− in (A.9) is negative and
differentiability of 휋− (훼, 훼̂, 푚, 푝, 푝̂, 푡) w.r.t. 푝 imply that 휕휋−(훼,훼̂,푚,푝,푝̂,푡)
휕푝
is negative
between 0 and ◦푝, and therefore rules out any price lower than ◦푝 as a best response to
◦푝.
For prices above ◦푝, it is readily verified that the minimum point 푝+ in (A.10)
satisfies 푝+ ∈
(
◦푝, 푝
)
. If 푝 ≤ 푝푀 , and the profit function is expressed by (15b) over[
◦푝, 푝
]
, then the seller’s profit achieves a local maximum over the same interval at
푝 = 푝. If 푝 > 푝푀 , then the profit is expressed by (15b) over
[
◦푝, 푝푀
]
, and by (A.4)
over [푝푀 , 푝 (훼, 푚, 푡)]; if 푝푀 > 푝+, then 푝푀 could in principle dominate ◦푝, from theseller’s point of view. In both scenarios, Lemma 2 guarantees that the choice of 푝푀dominates the choice of 푝, regardless of the ranking of the two prices. The critical
value of 푣 in (17) is then obtained by comparing the expected profits realized by
charging ◦푝 and by charging 푝푀 , respectively expressed by ◦휋
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
) in (19) and by
휋̂푀 = 훼푒−훼̂ 푚
(
푣 − 푡
2
)
.
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A.6. Proof of Lemma 3. The expression for the given partial derivative is
퐻훼̂
(
훼̂, 푡, 푚
)
= 푡 (2 + 훼̂ 푚) 푒
−훼̂ 푚 − 2
2 훼̂3푚2
− 푐′′
(
훼̂
)
The numerator of the ratio on the RHS, (2+ 훼̂ 푚) 푒−훼̂ 푚−2, is decreasing in 훼̂, and is
therefore maximized at 훼̂ = 0, where its value is equal to 0. Hence, the first term on
the RHS is always non-positive, and strict convexity of 푐(훼) implies that the entire
expression is negative for any value of 훼̂.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 4. If 훼̂ = 0, then our reference seller would only pos-
sibly face captive buyers, and the optimal price and expected profit per buyer
contacted, at any level of advertising, would both be equal to 푣 − 푡2 > 0. Be-cause the derivative 푐′ (훼̂) approaches 0 as 훼̂ → 0, the equilibrium advertising
level, if it exists, is necessarily positive. Existence follows then from the fact that
lim훼̂→0
{
퐻
(
훼̂, 푡, 푚
)}
= ∞ and lim훼̂→∞
{
퐻
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)}
= 0, as revealed by direct
calculation, whereas lim훼̂→0
{
푐′
(
훼̂
)}
= ∞, and uniqueness follows from negativity
of퐻훼̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
), established in Lemma 3.
A.8. Proof of Proposition 5. By multiplying both sides of the condition for an
equilibrium value in in (22) by 푚, we obtain
푚 푡
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 (1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) − 푚푐′ (훼̂) = 0.
The marginal effect of increased advertising on welfare is expressed by the LHS
of (11). As the private and social cost are identical, whether the social optimum
features a greater or a smaller advertising level than the symmetric monopolistically
competitive equilibrium, depends on whether the social marginal benefit is greater
than the private benefit at 훼̂, namely on the direction of the inequality
푒−훼̂ 푚
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝푚푣 +
푡
(
푒훼̂ 푚 −
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 − 훼̂ 푚 − 1)
2 훼̂2푚
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠−
푚 푡
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 (1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) ⋛ 0 (A.11)
However, for any 푡 such that the above expression is negative, there does not exist
an equilibrium associated with such a 푡. First, the LHS of (A.11) is positive at
푡 = 0 and decreasing in 푡 with a root at 푡 = 2 훼̂ 푚 푣1+훼̂ 푚 . Yet, for any 푡 greater than
2 훼̂ 푚 푣
1+훼̂ 푚 the price associated with such a 푡 would be greater than the monopoly price
푣 − 푡2 = 푣 −
1
2
2 훼̂ 푚 푣
1+훼̂ 푚 =
푣
1+훼̂ 푚 =
푡
2훼̂ 푚 (and so firms would deviate from that price).
A.9. Proof of Lemma 4. By Lemma 3, we have 퐻훼̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
< 0 for any 푚 > 0.
Hence, 푎(푚) does admit a derivative expressed by 푑푎(푚)
푑푚
= − 퐻푚(훼̂,푚,푡)
퐻훼̂(훼̂,푚,푡)
||||훼̂=푎(푚), where
퐻푚
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
= 훼̂ 푡 푒
−훼̂ 푚
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 − 4 훼̂2푚 푡(
2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2)2 (1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚)
= 푡
(
2 + 훼̂ 푚
)
푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2
2 훼̂2푚3
< 0;
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the last inequality follows from the fact that (2 + 훼̂ 푚) 푒−훼̂ 푚−2 is negative if 훼̂ > 0,
noted in the proof of Lemma 3. We can then conclude that 푑푎(푚)
푑푚
< 0 holds for any
positive value of 푚.
A.10. Proof of Lemma 5. To make a better use of previous results, it is convenient
to focus on the profit expression
Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
=
푡
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
2 훼̂ 푚2
− 푐
(
훼̂
)
,
which is readily obtained from (20), evaluated at 훼̂ = 푎(푚). The expression for the
partial derivative of the profit in (23) w.r.t. the mass of the active sellers can then be
written as
Π∗푚(퐹 ,푚, 푡) =
휕Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
휕푚
+
휕Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
휕훼̂
× 푑푎(푚)
푑푚
= −
푡
(
2 −
(
2 + 훼̂ 푚
)
푒−훼̂ 푚
)
2 훼̂ 푚3
×
푡
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
+ 2
(
훼̂ 푚
)2 (훼̂ 푐′′(훼) − 푐′ (훼̂))
푡 (2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚) 푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2푐′′(훼) 훼̂3푚2
.
Using the first order condition (21), written as 푡 (1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚) − 2 (훼̂ 푚)2 푐′(훼) = 0, we
can then establish the claim by writing
Π∗푚(퐹 ,푚, 푡) = −
푡
(
2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚) 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
훼̂2 푐′′
(
훼̂
)
푚
(
푡
(
2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚
)
푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2 훼̂3푚2 푐′′
(
훼̂
)) < 0, (A.12)
where the inequality is guaranteed by 푐′′(훼) > 0.
A.11. Proof of Lemma 6. Direct calculation yields
푑(푎(푚)푚)
푑푚
= 푑푎(푚)
푑푚
푚 + 푎(푚)
= −
2푐′′
(
훼̂
)
훼̂4푚2
푡
((
2 + 훼̂ 푚
)
푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2
)
− 2푐′′
(
훼̂
)
훼̂3푚2
|||||훼̂=푎(푚) . (A.13)
Given convexity of 푐(훼), the negativity of (2 + 훼̂ 푚) 푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2 < 0, established in
the proof of Lemma 3, allows us to conclude that the denominator of the previous
expression is certainly negative, and to thereby establish the result.
A.12. Proof of Lemma 7. By using once again the Implicit Function Theorem, we
obtain:
푑푚
푑퐹
= −
Π∗퐹 (퐹 ,푚, 푡)
Π∗푚(퐹 ,푚, 푡)
.
The result is then established by using (A.12) and noting that Π∗퐹 (퐹 ,푚, 푡) = −1.
A.13. Proof of Proposition 6. (24) expresses the equilibrium condition of the entry
game in (22) for any pair (훼̂, 푚) such that 훼̂ 푚 = log(2). Existence of a value of 훼̂
that solves (24) follows from positivity of 훼̂′ 푡4 log(2)2 and the fact that the range of 푐′(훼)is assumed to be the whole interval (0,∞). Moreover, strict convexity of 푐(훼) implies
that the solution is unique, and that there is thus a unique pair (훼̂, 푚) = (훼̂′, 푚′),
with 푚′ = log(2)
훼̂′
, that satisfies (24). Notice also that convexity of 푐(훼) and optimality
of 훼̂ imply positivity of the overhead margin for any pair (훼̂, 푚), and thus also
positivity of 퐹 ′ in (25).
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To identify the pairs (훼̂, 푚) that solve both (16) and (22), if any such pairs exist,
we then consider the derivative
푑(푎(푚)푚)
푑퐹
||||푚=푚∗(퐹 ) = 푑(푎(푚)푚)푑푚 ||||푚=푚∗(퐹 ) × 푑푚∗(퐹 )푑퐹 ,
whose RHS is the product of a positive and a negative factor, by Lemmas 6 and
7. The sign of 푑((훼̂,푚,푡)푚)
푑퐹
at 푚 = 푚∗(퐹 ) is therefore negative, and we can conclude
that the pairs (훼̂′, 푚′) that solve (16) and that do therefore qualify as equilibria for
the respective values of 퐹 , if 푣 ≥ ◦푣 in (17), are those corresponding to values of 퐹
smaller than 퐹 ′.
A.14. Proof of Proposition 7. We compare the marginal effect of entry, expressed
by the LHS of (10), and the monopolistically competitive free entry equilibrium
condition (23), both evaluated at 푚 = 푚∗(퐹 ) and 훼̂ = 푎 (푚∗(퐹 )). As the private
and the social fixed cost are identical, the social marginal benefit is greater than the
private benefit at the symmetric monopolistically competitive equilibrium if and
only if
푒−훼̂ 푚
(
푣 +
푡
(
푒훼̂ 푚 − 훼̂2푚2 − 훼̂ 푚 − 1
)
2 훼̂ 푚2
)
−
푡
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
2 훼̂ 푚2
||||||푚=푚∗(퐹 ),훼̂=푎(푚∗(퐹 )) > 0.
푒−푎(푚̂)푚
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝푣 +
푡
(
푒푎(푚̂)푚 − 푎
(
푚̂
)2푚2 − 푎 (푚̂)푚 − 1)
2 푎
(
푚̂
)
푚2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠ −
푡
(
1 − 푒−푎(푚̂)푚
)
2 푎
(
푚̂
)
푚2
> 0.
(A.14)
As with expression (A.11), expression (A.14) is decreasing in 푡 with a root at 푡 =
푣 2,훼̂ 푚1+훼̂ 푚 . However, as in the proof of Proposition 5, for any 푡 greater than 푣 2 훼̂ 푚1+훼̂ 푚there is no longer a symmetric monopolistically competitive equilibrium as the price
required for such an equilibrium would be greater than the monopoly price 푣 − 푡2(and so firms would deviate from that price).
APPENDIX B. COMPARATIVE STATICS
In B.1 below, we consider the responses of the endogenous variables to exogenous
changes in the transportation cost 푡, in advertising costs, and in the size of the set of
the active sellers 푚. In B.2, 푚 is endogenized. For presentational simplicity, though
the equilibrium level of advertising depends on 푡, etc., it will be subsumed in the
notation and only made explicit in the derivatives.
B.1. Exogenous 푚. In this section, 푚, 푡 and the function 푐(훼) are exogenous. As
noted in the main body, the results here are the same as in Grossman and Shapiro
(1984). In particular, as Grossman and Shapiro (1984) find, a change in cost has
an ambiguous effect on profits. To highlight which type of change in cost can lead
to an increase or a decrease in profit, we focus on two specific, standard types of
changes. We first consider an additive change in marginal cost by considering a
new cost function that can be decomposed into two parts: 푐̃(훼) ≡ 푐(훼) + 휎 훼, where
휎 is a real number, so 푐̃ ′(훼) = 푐′(훼) + 휎. One could also interpret this as asking
the effect of a small per-unit tax on advertising. An increase in this type of cost
always decreases profits. Second, we consider a multiplicative change in marginal
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cost by considering a different cost function that can be decomposed into the form
푐̌(훼) ≡ 푘푐(훼) + 퐹 , where 푘 is a real number, so 푐̌ ′(훼) = 푘푐′(훼). This case includes
quadratic cost functions, which we consider in Section 7. By convexity of 푐(훼), the
effect of a unit increase in 푘 on the (marginal) cost is greater at higher levels of
advertising. This could also view this as the effect of a small ad-valorem (based on
the marginal cost) tax on each unit of advertising when marginal cost is increasing.
An increase in this type of cost increases profits when marginal cost is large relative
to total costs. A summary of the results is presented in Table 1:
Endogenous variables
푝 훼 훼 푚 휋
Exogenous 퐹 0 0 0 −푡 + + + +
variables 휎 + − − −푘 + − − ?
푚 − − + −
TABLE 1. Comparative statics analysis with exogenous values of 푚.
B.1.1. Comparative statics on equilibrium advertising. We generally rely on nega-
tivity of the partial derivative of the condition for a symmetric equilibrium (퐻(훼̂, 푚, 푡),
equation (22)) w.r.t. 훼̂,퐻훼̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
), stated in Lemma 3. One useful fact from the
proof of Lemma 3 is that (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2 is decreasing in 훼̂, is maximized at
훼̂ = 0 and so is negative. Two comparative statics were already shown: entry (푚)
decreases advertising levels (푎(푚)), Lemma 4, and increases aggregate advertising
(푎(푚)푚), Lemma 6. A third is immediate: as entry costs 퐹 are fixed, they do not
affect advertising levels. Turning to 푡, we have
Lemma B.1. With exogenous 푚, an increase in transportation cost 푡 increases the
equilibrium level of advertising: 푑푎(푚)
푑푡
> 0.
Proof. As 푑푎(푚)
푑푡
= −퐻푡
퐻훼̂
|훼̂=푎(푚), we need to calculate퐻푡 from (22):
퐻푡(훼̂, 푚, 푡) =
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
2 (훼̂ 푚)2
> 0.
We then have
푑푎(푚)
푑푡
= −
퐻푡
퐻훼̂
||||훼̂=푎(푚) = −훼̂ (1 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚)푡((2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2)) − 2훼̂3푚2푐′′ (훼̂) > 0. (B.1)

We next consider the effect of change in cost on the level of advertising.
Lemma B.2. An additive or multiplicative increase in marginal cost decreases the
equilibrium level of advertising: 푑푎(푚)
푑휎
< 0 and 푑푎(푚)
푑푘
< 0.
Proof. As 푎(푚)
푑휎
= −퐻휎
퐻훼̂
|훼̂=푎(푚), we need to calculate 퐻휎 from (22) using 푐(훼) ≡
푐̃(훼) + 휎 훼:
퐻휎
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
= −1 < 0.
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We then have
푑푎(푚)
푑휎
= −
퐻휎
퐻훼̂
||||훼̂=푎(푚) = 2 훼̂3푚2푡((2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚 − 2)) − 2훼̂3푚2푐′′ (훼̂) < 0. (B.2)
For when, instead, it is a change in 푘 for cost function 푐̌(훼) ≡ 푘푐(훼) + 퐹 , 퐻푘 =
−푐 ′(훼) < 0 and the proof follows analogously (or any cost change that increases
marginal cost). 
B.1.2. Comparative statics on price. The effect of either type of change in marginal
cost on the equilibrium price, ◦푝 (훼̂, 푚, 푡) = 푡2훼̂푚 at 훼̂ = 푎(푚), is obvious: since byLemma B.2 advertising is decreasing in marginal cost, then we have
Lemma B.3. With exogenous 푚, an additive or multiplicative increase in marginal
cost increases the equilibrium price: 푑
◦푝
푑휎
> 0 and 푑
◦푝
푑푘
> 0.
For the effect of transportation cost 푡 on the equilibrium price, there is an indirect
and direct effect. The direct effect raises price, but the indirect effect reduces it: an
increase in 푡 causes 훼̂ to increase, which causes the price to fall. However, the direct
effect dominates:
Lemma B.4. If 푚 is exogenous, an increase in transportation cost 푡 increases the
equilibrium price: 푑
◦푝
푑푡
> 0.
Proof.
푑 ◦푝
푑푡
= 1
2
(
훼̂ 푚
) − 푡
2 훼̂2푚
푑푎(푚)
푑푡
= 1
훼̂ 푚
푡(1 − (1 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2푐′′(훼)훼̂3푚2
푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2푐′′(훼)훼̂3푚2
> 0,
where the inequality follows because 1 − (1 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚 is increasing in either 훼 or
푚 and at zero value for either is zero, i.e., the expression is non-negative. Hence,
the numerator and denominator are positive: increased transportation cost 푡 raises
the equilibrium price. 
The effect of entry (푚) on the equilibrium price, like with transportation cost 푡,
has a direct and indirect effect. By the direct effect, entry reduces the price – there is
more competition. However, there is an indirect effect: entry also reduces a firm’s
advertising level, and lower advertising increases price. However, it was shown in
Lemma 6 that aggregate advertising increases with entry, and therefore the direct
effect dominates: price decreases.
Lemma B.5. An increases in the size of the set of the active sellers decreases the
equilibrium price: 푑
◦푝
푑푚
< 0.
Proof.
푑 ◦푝
푑푚
= 푡
2(푎(푚)푚)2
−푑[푎(푚)푚]
푑푚
< 0,
where 푑(푎(푚)푚)
푑푚
> 0 by Lemma 6. 
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B.1.3. Comparative statics on equilibrium profit. For consistency, consider the
profit expression evaluated at 훼̂ = 푎(푚) from Appendix A:
Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
=
푡
(
1 − 푒−훼̂ 푚
)
2 훼̂ 푚2
− 푐
(
훼̂
)
. (B.3)
Changes in entry or transportation cost, etc. affect profits not only directly, but
indirectly through the equilibrium level of advertising (푎(푚)) of the other firms.
Starting with the effect of transportation cost 푡, differentiating equilibrium profits
(B.3) obtains
푑Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
푑푡
=
휕Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
휕푡
+
휕Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
휕훼̂
푑푎(푚)
푑푡
. (B.4)
In this case, it is easy to see from examining the profit expression (B.3) that the direct
effect on the RHS of (B.4) is positive. For the indirect effect, its second term was
shown in (B.1) to be positive: transportation cost 푡 increases the equilibrium levels
of advertising. However, intuitively the first part of the second term is negative as
greater equilibrium advertising reduces the demand from a contacted consumer (as
there is a greater possibility they received an advertisement from a better match)
and raises cost (this can be easily checked by differentiating (B.3) with respect to
훼̂). Thus, again the indirect effect runs contrary to the direct effect. However, the
expressions simplify, and an increase in transportation cost 푡 increases profits: the
direct effect dominates the indirect effect.
Lemma B.6. For exogenous 푚, an increase in transportation cost 푡 increases equi-
librium profits: 푑Π̂
푑푡
> 0.
Proof. Using (B.1) for 푑푎(푚)
푑푡
, and differentiating equilibrium profits with respect to
훼̂ and 푡, the expression simplifies to
푑Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
푑푡
= (1 − 푒
−훼̂ 푚)훼̂2 푐′′(훼)
푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2푐′′(훼) 훼̂3푚2
> 0, (B.5)
where again the first order condition (21) helps to simplify the numerator of the
second term on the RHS of B.4. 
We now turn to the effect of the two types of change in the marginal cost of
advertising on profits. Considering first an additive change, (휎) and differentiating
equilibrium profits obtains
푑Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
푑휎
=
휕Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
휕휎
+
휕Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
휕훼̂
푑푎(푚)
푑휎
. (B.6)
From inspection the direct effect is negative; a firm is worse off from an additive
increase in its marginal cost. For the indirect effect, the second term was shown
above to be negative: marginal cost decreases the equilibrium levels of advertising.
However, as noted when examining the effect of transportation cost 푡 on equilibrium
profits (Lemma B.6), the first part of the second term intuitively is also negative.
Once again, the indirect effect runs contrary to the direct effect. However, again the
expression simplifies, and it is straightforward to show that an additive increase in
marginal cost decreases profits:
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Lemma B.7. For exogenous 푚, an additive increase in marginal cost of advertising
decreases equilibrium profits: 푑Π̂
푑휎
< 0.
Proof. It is useful to rewrite the equilibrium profit expression as
Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
= 푡
2훼̂푚2
(1 − 푒−훼̂(휎)푚) − ∫
훼̂(휎)
0
(푐′(훼) + 휎)푑훼
Then (B.7), the derivative of the equilibrium profit w.r.t. 휎, becomes
푑Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
푑휎
= − ∫
훼̂(휎)
0
푑훼 +
[
푡푒−훼̂ 푚
2푚훼̂
− 푡(1 − 푒
−훼̂ 푚)
2(훼̂ 푚)2
− 푐′(훼̂(휎))
]
푑푎(푚)
푑휎
(B.7)
Using (B.2) for 푑푎(푚)∕푑휎 and collecting yields
푑Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
푑휎
= − 2훼̂
4푚2 푐′′(훼)
푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2훼̂3푚2 푐′′(훼)
< 0. (B.8)

This case of an additive increase in marginal cost is equivalent to the case of
훽 = 1 in Grossman and Shapiro (1984). Specifically, if their 훽 (the elasticity of
the marginal effect of the shift parameter on cost with respect to the proportion of
consumers reached) equals one (unit elastic), then an increase in the shift parameter
has zero effect on the advertising level (Grossman and Shapiro, 1984, Table 1),
which is the case here.21 Since 푐′′(훼) > 0 implies 휂 > 0 in Grossman and Shapiro
(1984), we have the same effect as they do: an additive increase in marginal cost
reduces equilibrium profits. It should also be clear that a different type of increase in
cost could result in equilibrium profits increasing. Indeed, a multiplicative increase
in cost (푘) could do this. In this case, equilibrium profits are
Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
= 푡
2훼̂푚2
(1 − 푒−훼̂푚) − 푘푐(훼̂)
Differentiating profits with respect to 푘 instead of 휎 is a slight modification to (B.7)
with the same general direct (higher 푘 increases costs) and indirect (higher costs (푘)
reduces equilibrium advertising which benefits the firm) effects. Specifically,
푑Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
푑푘
= − 푐(훼̂) +
[
푡푒−훼̂ 푚
2푚훼̂
− 푡(1 − 푒
−훼̂ 푚)
2(훼̂ 푚)2
− 푘푐′(훼̂)
]
푑푎(푚)
푑푘
This simplifies to
푑Π̂
(
훼̂, 푚, 푡
)
푑푘
= −푐(훼̂) + 푡(1 − (1 + 훼̂ 푚)푒
−훼̂ 푚) + 2훼̂2푚2푘푐′
푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚) + 2훼̂3푚2 푘 푐′′(훼)
훼̂푐′, (B.9)
and its sign depends on the relative size of the marginal cost to total costs. If the
former is sufficiently large, then profits could increase with an increase in 푘, as was
noted by Grossman and Shapiro (1984). In Example 7, we show that with cost of the
form 푘훼2 and “large” 훼 푚 in equilibrium, then an increase in 푘 increases equilibrium
profits.
21Specifically, here an additive increase in marginal cost increase advertising costs in our model
by 훼, and the derivative of that with respect to 훼 is of course 1.
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Endogenous variables
Exogenous 푚 Endogenous 푚
푝 훼̂ 훼̂ 푚 휋 | 푝 훼̂ 푚 훼̂ 푚
Exogenous 퐹 0 0 0 − | + + − −푡 + + + + | + 0 + +
variables 휎 + − − − | + 0 − −푘 + − − ?푎 | +? ?b ?푎 −?
푚 − − − − |
TABLE 2. Comparative statics analysis with endogenous values of
푚. Question mark indicates that if marginal cost is relatively large
to total cost, then profit increases (a possibility noted by Grossman
and Shapiro (1984)); otherwise they decrease. For example, with a
quadratic variable cost, an increase in 푘 increases profits.
aIf marginal cost is relatively large to total cost, then positive.
bIf marginal cost is relatively large to total cost, then negative. For
the case of 푘 on 푝 and 훼̂, even examples with profits increasing have
aggregate advertising decreasing (and so price increasing). For
changes in costs, if the marginal cost of advertising does not increase
uniformly for all levels of 훼 (the 푘 case), then it is possible in which
an increase in advertising cost increases profits (as Grossman and
Shapiro (1984) note)
.
B.2. Endogenous 푚. We now consider the effect of transportation cost 푡, adver-
tising costs 푐, and entry costs 퐹 when the size of the set of the active sellers 푚
is endogenous. Table 2 summarizes the effects, which include the results already
reported in Table 1 for exogenous values of 푚.
B.2.1. Comparative statics on the set of the active sellers. We begin by determining
the effect of transportation and entry costs on the entry equilibrium defined in (23):
Π∗(퐹 ,푚, 푡). Using the Implicit Function Theorem requires that Π∗푚(퐹 ,푚, 푡) < 0,that profits are decreasing in 푚, which has already been shown in (A.12).
The negative effect of the entry costs 퐹 on entry is established in Lemma 7. For
the effect of transportation cost 푡 on entry, from (B.5) an increase in transportation
cost 푡 increases profit (Π∗푡 (퐹 ,푚, 푡) > 0), and so its effect one entry is immediate:
Lemma B.8. An increase in transportation cost 푡 increases the size of the set of the
active sellers: 푑푚
푑푡
> 0.
Proof. From (B.5) we have Π∗푡 (퐹 ,푚, 푡) > 0 and from (A.12) we have Π∗푚(퐹 ,푚, 푡) <
0 and so 푑푚∕푑푡 = −Π∗푡 ∕Π∗푚 > 0, or specifically using the expressions (B.5,A.12),
푑푚
푑푡
= −
Π∗푡
Π∗푚
= (1 − 푒
−훼̂ 푚)푚
푡(2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚)
> 0. (B.10)

Turning to the effect of an additive increase in marginal cost 휎 on entry, it too
follows almost immediately.
33
Lemma B.9. An additive increase in marginal cost of advertising decreases the
size of the set of the active sellers: 푑푚
푑휎
> 0.
Proof. From expression (B.8) we have Π∗휎 < 0 and from (A.12) we have Π∗푚 < 0
and so 푑푚
푑휎
= −Π
∗
휎
Π∗푚
< 0, or explicitly
푑푚
푑휎
= − 2훼̂
2푚3
푡 (2 − (2 + 훼̂ 푚)푒−훼̂ 푚)
< 0. (B.11)

As noted in the preamble this could also be interpreted as the effect of a per-unit
tax on advertising, with it decreasing entry.
For the effect of a multiplicative increase in marginal cost, we have already seen
from (B.9) that such an increase could increase equilibrium profits if marginal cost
is relatively large (i.e., steeply sloped) on the margin. As a result, the effect of a
change in 푘 could either increase or decrease entry, and in the example of Section 7
with quadratic cost, increases entry. Lemma B.10 expresses the net result.
Lemma B.10. A multiplicative increase in marginal cost of advertising (e.g., when
푐(훼) = 푘훼2, 푑푚∕푑푘 > 0), increases the size of the set of the active sellers if the
marginal cost of the last unit is relatively large to total cost.
B.2.2. Long run effects on advertising. With the effects on entry from transportation,
marginal advertising cost, and entry cost, we can establish the entry equilibrium
effects of these costs (transport, advertising and entry) on advertising. Specifically,
we can use the first order condition in equilibrium (22), but now with entry level 푚
as a function of transportation and advertising costs from the free entry condition
(23). We begin with the effect of transportation cost 푡 on advertising levels. There
is, as usual, two opposing effects. First, the direct effect of increasing transportation
cost 푡 for fixed 푚 (positive, established in Lemma B.1) leads to more advertising.
However, there is also the indirect effect: increases in 푡 induce entry, which has a
negative effect on advertising levels. These two effects cancel out.
Lemma B.11. With endogenous 푚, an increase in transportation cost 푡 does not
affect a firm’s advertising level: 푑푎(푚∗(퐹 ))∕푑푡 = 0.
Proof. In Lemma 3 it was established that퐻훼̂ < 0. With the calculation of 푑푚∕푑푡(B.10),
퐻푡 =
푡(푒−훼̂ 푚(2 + 훼̂ 푚) − 2)
2훼̂2푚3
푑푚(푡, 퐹 )
푑푡
+ 1 − 푒
−훼̂ 푚
2훼̂2푚2
= 0.
Thus,
푑푎(푚∗(퐹 ))
푑푡
= −
퐻푡
퐻훼̂
||||푚=푚∗(퐹 ),훼̂=푎(푚∗(퐹 )) = 0.

Since increases in transportation cost 푡 do not change any one firm’s advertising
in the long run, but does induce entry, it follows that
Corollary B.1. With endogenous 푚, an increase in transportation cost 푡 increases
aggregate advertising.
The effect of entry costs 퐹 is immediate: since entry costs 퐹 reduce entry 푚, but
does not affect advertising directly, we have
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Lemma B.12. With endogenous 푚, an increase in entry costs increases advertising
level per firm: 푑푎(푚
∗(퐹 ))
푑퐹
> 0.
As it has already been shown in Lemma 6 that entry increases aggregate advertis-
ing, and since entry costs do not affect advertising levels directly, it follows
Corollary B.2. With endogenous 푚, an increase in entry cost decreases aggregate
advertising.
We next turn to the effect of changes in the costs of advertising on advertising in
the long run. Beginning with an additive increase in marginal cost for advertising
(or equivalents a per-unit tax on advertising), there are two counter effects. On one
hand, for a fixed number of firms an increase in marginal cost, reduces equilibrium
advertising. However, it also reduces profits which induces exit, which has a positive
effect on advertising, so the net effect is unclear. It turns out that the effects exactly
offset themselves, and so an additive increase in marginal cost does not affect the
long run equilibrium advertising per firm.
Lemma B.13. With endogenous 푚, an additive increase in the marginal cost of
advertising does not affect a firm’s advertising level: 푑푎(푚
∗(퐹 ))
푑휎
= 0.
Proof. In Lemma 3, it was established that퐻훼̂ < 0. With the calculation of 푑푚푑휎 in(B.11),
퐻휎 =
푡(푒−훼̂ 푚(2 + 훼̂ 푚) − 2)
2훼̂2푚3
푑푚
푑휎
− 1 = 0,
Thus,
푑훼̂
푑휎
= −
퐻휎
퐻훼̂
||||푚=푚∗(퐹 ),훼̂=푎(푚∗(퐹 )) = 0.

While the result may initially seem surprising, it too is in line with what Grossman
and Shapiro (1984) found, because as discussed after Lemma B.7, 훽 = 1 in this
case. Finally, although the advertising per firm does not change, since the increase
in marginal cost induced exit, aggregate advertising has decreased - witness Lemma
B.3.
Corollary B.3. With endogenous 푚, an increase in a per unit-tax on advertising
(an additive increase in marginal cost) decreases aggregate advertising.
Thus, a per-unit tax on advertising level would have the expected effect of reducing
aggregate advertising.
Finally turning to the effect of a multiplicative increase in marginal cost 푘, not
surprisingly given Lemma B.10, such a change in cost could increase or decrease
a firm’s advertising level in the long run, depending on the relative size of the
marginal cost on the margin: if the marginal cost is relatively small, then it is
possible a firm’s advertising increases. The intuition follows from Lemma B.10: if
on the margin, marginal cost is relatively small, this induces exit, which increases
the equilibrium level of advertising (Lemma 4). This effect has to be large enough to
offset the direct effect from the increase in marginal cost. For aggregate advertising,
this becomes even more muddled as exit on its own would decrease aggregate
advertising. However, for the quadratic cost example presented in the example in
Section 7, for “large” 훼̂ 푚, a multiplicative increase in marginal cost, decreases
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aggregate advertising. That is, the direct effect on an individual firm in reducing its
advertising overwhelms the entry effect on aggregate advertising.
B.2.3. Long run effects on price. The long-run effect of different variables on price
is primarily through the effect on aggregate advertising 푎(푚)푚, and so the above
corollaries on the long-run effects on aggregate advertising determine the effect on
price (except for transportation cost 푡). We begin by considering the effect of entry
costs 퐹 on the equilibrium price ◦푝 in (18) at 훼̂ = 푎(푚∗(퐹 ), 푚 = 푚∗(퐹 ). Because
entry increases aggregate advertising (which decreases price), increases in fixed
cost increase the price.
Lemma B.14. With endogenous 푚, an increase in entry cost increases price: 푑
◦푝
푑퐹
>
0.
Proof. Differentiation of the expression for the equilibrium price (18) with respect
to the fixed cost 퐹 yields
푑 ◦푝
푑퐹
||||훼̂=푎(푚∗(퐹 ),푚=푚∗(퐹 ) = − 푡2 푑푎(푚)푚푑푚 푑푚푑퐹 1푎(푚)2 > 0.
The term 푑푎(푚)푚)
푑푚
was established as positive in lemma 6. The term 푑푚
푑퐹
was
determined to be negative in Lemma 7. Thus, the total effect is for fixed cost to
increase the equilibrium price because aggregate advertising decreases. 
We next consider the effect of an additive increase in marginal cost (휎). From
Corollary B.3, we know that an additive increase inmarginal cost decreases aggregate
advertising, and so from (18) it increases the long-run price 푑◦푝
푑휎
> 0.
Corollary B.4. With endogenous 푚, an increase in an additive increase in marginal
cost (or a small per-unit tax on advertising) increases the price.
Turning to the effect of a multiplicative increase in marginal cost, as the effect on
aggregate advertising is ambiguous, the effect on the long-run price is ambiguous.
Again, for the example of Section 7, with “large” 훼̂ 푚, given that aggregate advertis-
ing decreases with a multiplicative increase in marginal cost, the long-run price is
increasing in this case.
The final comparative static is of transportation cost 푡 on the equilibrium price.
푑푝
푑푡
||||훼̂=푎(푚∗(퐹 ),푚=푚∗(퐹 ) = 12훼̂ 푚 − 푡2(훼̂ 푚)2
(
휕[훼̂푚]
휕푚
푑푚
푑푡
+ 휕훼̂
휕푡
푚
)
. (B.12)
The first term is the direct effect from an increase in transportation cost 푡 on the
price and is positive. The second term is the indirect effect from transportation
cost 푡 increasing. This induces more entry, which we have seen increases aggregate
advertising thereby reducing the price, running counter to the direct effect. There is
also the effect transportation cost 푡 has directly on equilibrium advertising levels, but
that was shown to be zero in Lemma B.11. The sum of terms proves to be positive.
Lemma B.15. With endogenous 푚, an increase in transportation cost 푡 increases
the long run price.
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Proof. Substituting A.13 and B.10 into B.12 and collecting the terms we have
푑푝
푑푡
||||훼̂=푎(푚∗(퐹 ),푚=푚∗(퐹 ) = 푡(푒−훼 푚(2 + 훼 푚) − 2)2 − 2 푐′′(훼) 훼̂3푚2푡(푒−훼 푚(1 + 훼 푚) − 1))(푒−훼 푚(2 + 훼 푚) − 2)[푡(푒−훼 푚(2 + 훼 푚) − 2) − 2푐훼̂3푚2] > 0.
The inequality follows because as shown before both 푒−훼 푚(1+훼 푚)−1 and 푒−훼 푚(2+
훼 푚) − 2 are non-positive. 
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